Houston is more than just its business community. When considered as a whole, the contradictions become quite apparent. Feagin's discussion of regulatory policy gets at the heart of this contradiction. Regulatory policy is the arch enemy of free market ideology. Nevertheless, Houston's business community has been quick to seek government regulation when profits were threatened by overproduction. The establishment of the Texas Railroad Commission, the use of the National Guard, and the lobbying for a federal czar in the 1930s were attempts by the oil industry to enforce production quotas. Such fervor has been missing in social and environmental regulation, two areas in which Houston's government lags far behind. It is here that one finds evidence of a free market city: weak to nonexistent enforcement of environmental laws, an absence of public planning (epitomized by the lack of zoning), minimal taxes, and limited social services.

Houston's rapid growth and neglect of infrastructure has resulted in serious problems of hazardous waste disposal (one of the worst in the country), water and air pollution, traffic congestion, and neighborhood deterioration. As a result of the city's uneven development and its discrimination in public service distribution, these problems disproportionately affect minorities and poor people. Ironically, Houston's low level of social welfare spending has not kept it from the fiscal fate of its more "generous" northeastern counterparts. Feagin argues that Houston's conservative tax structure and neglect of basic infrastructure have caused a fiscal crisis.

Feagin's insightful analysis suggests that the policy question is not one of government intervention versus no intervention. Rather, the question is: "What type of government intervention?" This is the key question because, as Feagin so aptly demonstrates, there are clear winners and losers. Houston is not unique in its economic development priorities, in its uneven development, or in the inequitable distribution of costs and benefits that characterize its economic growth. It is unique in its claims of a free enterprise city. However, as Feagin persuasively demonstrates, Houston's free enterprise component is as uneven as its development picture. We have laissez faire for the less powerful, and substantial government assistance for those with economic resources. In debunking the "Houston myth," Feagin's study makes an excellent contribution to the urban political economy literature.

BARBARA FERMAN
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Dilemmas of Social Democracy: The Spanish Socialist Workers Party in the 1980s *by Donald Share. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press, 169 pp. $39.95.*

Donald Share's book is a useful introduction to perhaps the most successful political party in Europe during the past decade. Basing himself on the increasingly voluminous literature on Spain's remarkable transition to democracy, as well as

on a careful reading of the press and of political survey data, Share brings together much pertinent information within a brief compass. The book's central purpose is "to explain both the rapid political success of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (the PSOE) in the 1980s and [its] equally rapid abandonment of social democratic policies once in government" (p. 9). It begins with a chapter on the history of the PSOE; although inaccurate in some details, the chapter is valuable in highlighting the extreme personalization of power within the PSOE during most of its existence, the high cost of the mass mobilization and radicalization it experienced in the 1930s, the bitter internal conflicts that almost wrecked the party during the 1930s and 1940s, and the shallowness of the PSOE's intellectual tradition. Directly or indirectly, all four factors affected the nature of the modern party that began to emerge during the last year of Franco's dictatorship.

But the specific characteristics of the present-day PSOE were mostly laid out during the transition to democracy from 1975 to 1982. The chapter analyzing this period is probably Share's best. In thirty short pages the author provides an excellent survey of the many stages in the PSOE's autodefinition: its reluctant acceptance of Suarez's model of democratization without sharp political rupture, its successful juggling of moderate programs that would appeal to the electorate with a radical image capable of motivating party militants, its ability to transcend and ultimately absorb several other competing socialist parties, the elimination of effective internal dissent, and the centralization of power in the party in 1979. In this entire process, the figure of Felipe Gonzalez was central. Unlike Adolfo Suarez, the brilliant architect of Spain's transition to democracy who was nevertheless incapable of building a lasting political base, Gonzalez forged a strong party mechanism responsive to its leadership's wishes.

With the collapse of Suarez's Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) in 1982 ("one of the worst electoral drubbings of any governing party in history" p. 101), the PSOE won its chance to govern, only to prove while in office that it had evolved "from social democracy to neoliberalism" (p. 97). Share describes the process in his fourth chapter, focusing on the economic policies followed by Gonzalez's government and on its shift from opposition to NATO membership to support of it.

In the fifth chapter, Share tries to explain why the shift occurred. In addition to the historical factors and extreme centralization of party power, he emphasizes the lack of viable political alternatives to the PSOE after the dual collapse of the UCD and of the Spanish Communist Party in the 1982 elections, as well as the concordance between a now nonideological party and an equally nonideological electorate. Ultimately, this last factor is the most crucial, and one wishes that Share had devoted more space to it. Why has the Spanish electorate, traditionally Europe's most volatile, become so moderate? Why is it that the huge mass of unemployed workers (one-fifth of the total active population) not only accepts its lot with relative passivity but actually continues to vote Socialist? These are the type of intellectually interesting questions that Share's brief survey cannot do full justice to.

The concluding chapter evaluates the PSOE's overall performance, giving it relatively high marks in comparison to past Spanish governments. Yet the book ends pessimistically, observing that the PSOE may have to pay the price for its abandonment of ideology and high degree of centralization of power around Gonzalez once it finally loses office. Then, no ideals capable of mobilizing the party rank and file will remain, and the accumulated resentments of the ideological and regional groups that have now been silenced will burst forth. Both points seem valid to me, as does almost every other major observation of this eminently sensible book. Although depth of analysis is often lacking, I know of no better introduction to Spain's hegemonic political party than Share's work.

EDWARD MALEFAKIS
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Soviet Policy towards Japan: An Analysis of Trends in the 1970s and 1980s *by Myles L. C. Robertson. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1988. 234 pp. $39.50.*

Books of this kind always present a problem. In theory one should be able to write about country A's policy toward country B without knowing anything about country B. In practice, such an approach never really succeeds. It is always necessary to talk about country B in order to make suppositions, judgments, guesses. Robertson has fallen into this trap. He knows little about Japan and is forced to do all three at his peril.

This four-chapter book is not an analysis of all the trends in Soviet policy towards Japan. It principally covers ideology and economic and military relations. Seeking the source of Soviet ideological views of Japan at the global and regional levels and of Japan's social and political structure, Robertson discusses writings in Soviet theoretical and academic journals, conversations he had with Soviet and western academics, and writings by western scholars. As for the economic relationship, after dealing with the Siberian development projects and the politics and technical difficulties of the trade relationship, Robertson concludes that neither is really that important to either side.

Robertson treats Soviet military policy toward Japan from the standpoints of strategy in Northeast Asia and the Pacific, including conventional warfare plans and naval operations and the actual policy in operation. Part of this has been overtaken by events; but with Soviet concern over the build-up of Japanese forces and with nuclear warfighting, the scenarios for a conventional war with Japan and the use of Soviet forces as a political instrument remain valid. In discussing operations he brings together several interesting and useful charts and tables of both Japanese and Soviet military strength.

In the final chapter Robertson discusses the way in which government works in Japan and the degree of success the Soviets have had in understanding and using