The Franquist Regime and the Dilemma of Succession

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This article explores the Spanish franquist regime's attempts to resolve a succession crisis, as the death of Francisco Franco appeared imminent in the late 1960's. It argues that Franco established the mechanisms for a smooth succession to the posts of head of state and head of government. However, these mechanisms failed to achieve Franco's major goal: the continuation of authoritarian rule after his death. Ironically, Franco's apparently ingenious "solution" to the dilemmas of succession facilitated a democratic transition that would have horrified the dictator.

Introduction[1]

Fifty years after Spain's civil war, Spanish voters elected a socialist government for the second time in four years. The peaceful alternation of power from the Center-Right to Center-Left in 1982, and the Socialists' successful relations with the armed forces while in government, both signaled the end of Spain's peculiar transition to democracy.[2] Only seven years after the death of Franco, Spain had a fully democratic regime, a Socialist government, and a quasi-federal system. While the transition involved important sacrifices and costs, virtually all observers agree that the transition to democracy has been far less conflictual than expected. In other countries, opponents to authoritarian rule viewed with optimism the smoothness and success of the "Spanish route" to democracy.

Yet this impressive scenario presents a paradox. The franquist regime (1939-1977) was among the most stable and "successful" authoritarian regimes in history. It survived almost forty years without capitulating to a myriad of internal and external pressures for change.[3] It is counterintuitive that such a strong and stable authoritarian regime would evolve into (indeed produce) its antithesis. The solution to the puzzle of the Spanish case may therefore be instructive for those seeking to understand more about the dynamics of authoritarian regimes in general, and the question of leadership succession in particular.[4]

This article explores how the Spanish franquist regime resolved the thorny problem of succession for the positions of head of state and head of government. It argues that Francisco Franco endowed his regime with sufficient mechanisms for an orderly, peaceful, le-

gal—what will be deemed for the moment "successful"—succession for both of those positions. While Franco's plans for leadership succession worked smoothly, they did not achieve the goal sought by the dictator: the perpetuation of an authoritarian regime. Moreover, and perhaps ironically, Franco's peculiarly crafted succession formula created the political "space" within which Spain's democratization could take place.

The Spanish case is somewhat unusual in that its top leadership position, the head of state, was occupied by the regime founder for all but two years of the regime's existence. Thus, the question of succession was even more problematic in Spain than in such regimes as authoritarian Brazil or Mexico, where presidential succession was or is regularized (although nomination for presidential candidates did not follow explicit legal procedures).[5]

Leadership succession in Spain resulted not only in a new head of state, but led rather quickly to a new democratic regime.[6] Thus, it is worth asking how Franco's solution to the succession crisis contributed to Spain's most unusual democratization "from above" after 1975. If so, then an apparently "successful" leadership succession, from the perspective of a stable and orderly transfer of power between leaders, may have been, from the perspective of continuity of authoritarian rule, exactly the opposite: a failed succession that led to democratic transition.

This puzzle illustrates the complexity of studying leadership succession in authoritarian regimes. When authoritarian regimes approach the question of leadership succession, while at the same time attempting to reform and/or update the regime to accommodate various pressures, weaknesses or socioeconomic changes, the meaning of successful leadership may be ambiguous. In the *narrowest* sense, leadership succession may be seen as successful whenever power is transferred in an orderly and presumably peaceful manner. In a *broader,* and far more important sense, successful leadership successions usually must entail an orderly transfer of power *and* a subsequent reequilibration of the authoritarian coalition. In the *broadest,* and most ambiguous sense, leadership succession in an authoritarian regime would be successful where it also allowed for the needed "reforms" of the regime to occur, and ultimately, where it fostered the perpetuation of the rules regulating the exercise of power.

In this light, Franco's meticulous plans for his own succession were only "successful" in the first and narrowest sense. He failed to

endow his regime with leaders or institutions that could reequilibrate the franquist coalition. Ultimately, his successors could not, or would not, reform (and thus salvage) the authoritarian regime.

The Dilemma of Leadership Succession in Authoritarian Regimes

Leadership succession in authoritarian regimes is usually problematic.[7] When political scientists study leadership succession in democratic systems, it is often a rather technical exercise. Democratic regimes have explicit rules regulating leadership succession, so to study succession necessarily involves studying constitutions, party rules, and elections.

Authoritarian regimes, in contrast, are almost by definition characterized by an absence of regularized legal forms of succession.[8] This stems in large part from the peculiar nature of political contestation in authoritarian regimes. To quote Juan Linz's classic characterization of authoritarian regimes:

> The lack of all-pervasive and successful efforts at mobilization by a single organization and leadership permits attempts at penetration of the society by the pluralistic elements in the power structure. On the other hand, the legal or de facto limit on the spontaneous emergence of organized groups that distinguishes the limited pluralism of such regimes from democracies, restricts the opportunity for participation of large sectors of the population, either as supporters or as opposition.[9]

Authoritarian regimes most often are supported by a coalition of disparate interests. Originally, these disparate plural groups may share in common a fear of and/or disdain for the previous regime. They may also share a few basic, ambiguous goals, such as anticommunism, "order" or "economic growth." Over time, some members of the original coalition will begin to distance themselves from the top leadership, for a variety of reasons. Disillusionment over policies implemented by the regime leadership, declining fear of a return to a regime similar to the previous one, personality conflicts, resentment over favoritism in political appointments, socioeconomic change and pressure, and international developments may all give rise to defections from the authoritarian camp. At the same time, the regime will likely gain new adherents from a variety of sectors. Social strata that benefit from policies and patronage of the authoritarian regime, those who appreciate the benefits

of "law and order," those drawn to a successful authoritarian leader or his charisma, and various socioeconomic changes can all provide new sources of support for the regime.

Successful authoritarian leaders are able to adapt to such changes by altering the composition of the authoritarian coalition.[10] They must provide each coalition group access to influence, power and rewards, while rendering each group politically powerless. Occasionally this may entail purging groups that have become too influential, popular or confident, or playing coalition partners off against each other. In his study of southern European authoritarianism, Salvador Giner noted that all authoritarian regimes of the region:

> possessed a syncretic ideological substratum, ranging from fundamentalist fascism to ultramontane monarchical legitimism from which the dictator and the government freely chose at every political juncture. In fact, one of the main tasks of the chief of state was to establish the successive adequate balances within the amalgam and to emphasize each one of its aspects according to time and place.[11]

In Portugal and Spain, long-lived regime founders were able to equilibrate authoritarian coalitions for an extended period. Their charisma, as victors over the preceding regimes, and as successful regime builders, despite significant domestic and international obstacles, gave them unparalleled power to maintain a harmony of disparate regime supporters. Nevertheless, even in these best of circumstances, rapid economic growth (especially in the Spanish case), international developments (in both cases, but especially Portugal) and such factors as scandals (Spain) or attempted coups (Portugal) compelled both dictators to make adjustments to their coalitions.

Limited pluralism exists in most authoritarian regimes, but it is fundamentally distinct from the pluralism experienced by democratic regimes. In authoritarian regimes, no links are permitted between elites and potential mass constituencies.

> Plural groups share power in authoritarian regimes as a result of decisions made by the leader of the inner group of the regime and their willingness to co-opt them (often in response to changing situations and/or public opinion at home and abroad). Authoritarian regimes are likely to be somewhat responsive (largely through anticipated reactions) but not accountable.[12]

The fact that the leader of the authoritarian coalition controls access of plural groups to power, and the fact that these actors' ability to compete for power depends upon the leader's good will, makes the question of leadership succession especially crucial. Unlike democratic regimes, with their legal separation of powers, party organizations, free press, and legitimate organized interest groups, or totalitarian regimes, with their powerful party bureaucracies and restraining ideologies, authoritarian regimes endow coalition leaders with unusual power and autonomy to control the access of plural groups. Thus, the struggle to influence the outcome of a leadership succession often takes on increased significance.

Leadership succession almost always threatens to disturb the delicate balance among coalition forces, and it is for this reason that the prospect of succession in authoritarian regimes is almost always perceived as a "crisis." Where a regime leader, but especially a regime founder, has ruled for a long period, the prospect of succession will create a particularly profound crisis. During the extended mandate of such a leader, the distance between the contending members of the authoritarian coalition and the apex of the authoritarian hierarchy will have become especially large. The prospect of this leader's absence from the leadership of the regime raises the specter of a huge power vacuum, into which the relatively weak regime groups and ultimately even the disaggregated (and suddenly repoliticized) masses may be drawn.

Authoritarian regimes, such as Brazil (1964-1984), Argentina (1976-1983) or Mexico, that have become accustomed to a regular succession of leaders are certainly at an advantage in this respect. But even in these cases, there is evidence that fierce, and potentially dangerous power struggles among contending elites occurred around the succession issue.[13] In most authoritarian regimes, selection of a successor too closely identified with any one regime support group will cause resentment and may lead to the successor's inability to balance groups in the necessary manner.[14] The physical disappearance of a dominant leader in an authoritarian regime serves to broaden the meaning of limited pluralism and may begin to associate individual coalition partners with specific types of options for resolving the succession crisis.[15] In the absence of the authoritarian leader (or with his/her incapacitation or "lame duck" status), there is always fear that some players in the game of limited pluralism may view previously prohibited mass-

level contestation as a means to enhance their influence over the resolution of the succession crisis. According to Philippe Schmitter:

> Unless authoritarian regimes can create a viable, aggregative governmental party that provides an institutional cover for executive succession or, much more problematically, rely upon some parallel form of legitimacy such as the monarch (Spain) they are likely to find it exceedingly difficult to choose a successor within their ranks.[16]

Because it alters power at the apex of the authoritarian hierarchy, leadership succession creates an exceptional political space within which regime supporters may temporarily struggle without the presence of a supreme arbiter. During such a struggle, the diverse, even contradictory nature of the authoritarian coalition may become increasingly evident. Those concerned first and foremost with the continuation of authoritarian rule must seek mechanisms with which to limit the potential dangers of leadership succession. The remainder of this article examines how one authoritarian leader, Francisco Franco, faced this challenge. Franco's long delay in dealing with the succession question suggests that he was well aware of the complexity and potential pitfalls of succession in authoritarian regimes.

The Franquist Authoritarian Regime

The franquist regime emerged from the ashes of the failed Second Republic (1931-1936). While antidemocratic forces were ultimately responsible for the burial of Spanish democracy, the parliamentary regime manifested severe defects from its inception.[17] The republic's leaders had the misfortune of attempting to construct a progressive parliamentary democracy amidst the volatile and highly mobilized society of post-World War I Spain, and within an international context hostile toward democracy. The result was a chaotic and uncontrollable multiparty system, polarized from the very start. Encouraged by the electoral laws, Spain's parties quickly faced each other in two ideologically hostile and particularly vindictive blocs. Control of the government shifted between the Right and Left three times in six years, and the swing of this pendulum was finally halted by the rebellion of the Nationalist forces.

During the virulent fratricide of the Spanish civil war (1936-

1939), General Francisco Franco was able to gain control of the diverse Nationalist forces, despite the fact that he was neither a major instigator of the Nationalist rebellion, nor an original supporter of it.[18] Franco had become Spain's youngest general in 1934, was named commander in chief of Spain's crack Moroccan forces in 1935, and soon after became chief of the General Staff. By 1936, when he agreed to lead the Moroccan contingent in the Nationalist uprising, Franco had unquestionable prestige as an outstanding soldier and a shrewd tactician. Fortune played a large role in Franco's accession, since General Sanjurjo, the most likely leader of the Nationalist forces, was killed in an accident during the fighting. As the rebel generals sought to unite the Nationalist forces under a single military command, they unanimously chose Franco (September 1936), both because of his unparalleled prestige and because he was not identified with any of the diverse political currents supporting the uprising.[19] Originally, this "Decree of the Junta" intended only to make Franco military commander. Nevertheless, under pressure from the more radical Falangist forces within the military, Franco was shortly after proclaimed chief of state of Nationalist Spain (October 1936), and endowed with the power to "establish, consolidate and develop the new State." [20]

The coalition of forces backing the new dictator was extremely diverse.[21] It included monarchists (seeking the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy), traditional Carlists (seeking the restoration of the Carlist pretender as well as the imposition of a conservative, clerical state), Falangists (a small political party advocating a fascist dictatorship), Catholics (seeking mainly a restoration of church privileges and the elimination of anticlerical forces), originally some disaffected liberals (mostly monarchists), and, of course, much of the armed forces. With only a few changes, these would continue to be the main political *familias* ("families") of the Franquist regime until its demise.[22] These disparate forces were united only in their desire to destroy the Second Republic and defeat the perceived bolshevik and anarchist threat. The exact nature of the future political system was not made clear by the new dictator, and was not given much attention until the spring of 1937.

Franco eventually built his regime around the ideology of the Falange Española Tradicionalista-Juntas Ofensivas Nacionales Sindicalistas (Spanish Traditionalist Falange-National Syndicalist

Offensive, FET y de las JONS), an improvised catchall movement incorporating the Falangists (whose most radical and charismatic leadership had been either killed or marginalized), the Carlists (hence the "traditionalist" label), monarchists, and all other supporters of the Nationalist forces.[23] This organization would eventually become the *National Movement*, a term selected intentionally so as to avoid any partisan connotations. The head of state was to be its leader ("Supreme Caudillo of the Movement"), thus ensuring its subservience to the dictator. The fact that Falangism and Carlism were almost entirely contradictory in their ideological and sociological underpinnings supports the notion that Franco and his top supporters were searching for the least restrictive ideology possible, and one that would ultimately suit the consolidation of the dictator's personal power. Thus, Franco extolled the virtues of Ferdinand and Isabella while adopting fascist totalitarian rhetoric.

In early 1938, the legal-institutional contours of the new regime began to take shape. The offices of head of state and head of government were formally specified, but both were given to Franco. Franco gained virtually unlimited powers to legislate by decree, and these powers were never effectively eroded, despite window dressing to the contrary.

As early as 1938, when Franco formed his first cabinet, his desire to maintain an equilibrium between the franquist families was completely clear. The dictator gave cabinet posts to two monarchists, two Carlists, two Falangists, and four independent military members. The costly but total victory achieved by Franco's forces in April 1939 enhanced Franco's prestige and power. By the end of the civil war, the dictator's position vis-à-vis his support groups was unassailable.

> Rather than relying on any one force, Franco drew them together in an eclectic hodge-podge, with himself as arbiter. He was able to do this because he was military Commander-in-Chief and not fully identified with any specific political order.[24]

Franco was never successful in creating a coherent ideology for his regime, and was only slightly more successful in the construction of an institutional edifice. He had a profound distrust of ideology and intellectuals, no doubt explaining why his regime produced no clear ideology and few renowned intellectuals. What Franco lacked in these categories, however, he made up for in the areas of pragmatism and coalition managements. In terms of

pragmatism, Franco knew how to adhere to what worked, and then change when necessary. As for coalition management, Franco skillfully maintained a balance among his supporters up until his death. With both of these talents, Franco was able to realize his only real goal: the maintenance of his dictatorial power and the guarding against power contenders.

The conflicts between members of the franquist family were plentiful, but they never eroded the dictator's personal power, and usually enhanced it. Franco's first significant chance to prove his skills as supreme arbiter of family conflicts came in 1942, when a potentially dangerous conflict erupted between hard-line Falangists (pro-Nazi, totalitarian and anticlerical) and ultraconservatives, especially Carlists (favoring neutrality and clerical policies). In what was to become typical franquist practice, Franco weakened *both* families by purging their most powerful representatives from the cabinet.[25] In this way, he simultaneously quelled the dispute and enhanced his own personal power. Later, as World War II drew to a close and monarchist forces became more vocal, both against the discredited Falangists and in favor of a restoration of the monarchy, Franco decreased the presence of both factions in the cabinet. With remarkable consistency, Franco continued to parcel out cabinet posts fairly equally to each family for the duration of the regime, as documented in one of the earliest serious studies of the regime conducted by Juan Linz.[26]

Franco's pragmatism, coalition management skills, and attraction to political power were all evident when he first addressed the question of leadership succession in 1947, ten years after he had become head of state. Motivated by a desire to clearly distinguish his regime from the defeated and discredited fascist regimes, and seeking to prevent speculation and intrigue surrounding the succession question, Franco submitted the Law of Succession to the people for their approval in a plebiscite.

This law perfectly reflected Franco's strategy at the time. In order to appease the world community and the monarchists at home, the law restored the institution of the monarchy in Spain. However, so as not to exacerbate the historical split within the monarchist camp, by and large a strong support group for the regime, the law named no successor and did not identify the future royal family, requiring only that the successor be "of royal lineage." What might have been viewed as a pure victory for the monarchist camp was tempered by the provision that the future monarch

adhere to the fascistic Fundamental Laws and Principles of the regime. The Church was ensured, no doubt needlessly, that the successor would be Catholic. Most significantly, the law gave Franco absolute power to name his own successor, without any time limitation. For the duration of his lifetime, Franco, as dictator, acted in place of the monarch. To add to the facade of monarchical restoration, the law called for the creation of a "Council of the Realm" and a "Regency Council" that would include the most important of Franco's hand-picked officials. Their function would be to advise Franco on important matters, and ensure the continuity of the system in the event of Franco's death before naming a successor.

Franco waited for over twenty years to name a successor. If the Law of Succession pleased all, the naming of a specific successor was bound to cause more dissent. By keeping the issue of succession off the agenda, Franco defused, for as long as was possible, the most dangerous issue threatening the authoritarian coalition. Meanwhile, Franco arbitrated the unending and increasingly bitter struggle between regime families.[27]

The most serious battle between families culminated in 1956, when the last of the Falangist die-hards sought to constitutionalize the franquist regime according to their principles, some of which would have begun to remove political power from Franco's hands.[28] The Falangist plans drew hostile reactions from virtually every other regime family, but especially the technocratic capitalists of the Opus Dei.[29] Having overstepped the limits of limited pluralism, and having indirectly threatened both the harmony of the authoritarian coalition and Franco's control, the Falangists' power was decreased (but by no means eliminated). Franco took this opportunity to adapt his regime to a fundamentally distinct domestic and international environment. Internationally, the cold war quickly eroded the hostility of such important potential patrons as the United States.[30] Domestically, Spain's autarchic political economic strategy had nearly bankrupted the country. As a calculated, pragmatic response, Franco replaced the demoted Falangists with conservative Opus Dei technocrats, thus paving the way for Spain's economic liberalization, and facade democratization.[31]

The rise of the Opus Dei technocrats, and the subsequent defascistization of the franquist regime, exacerbated the competition and distrust between the Opus and the Falange. As usual, Franco

played on this competition and turned it to his personal advantage. The Falangists despised the Opus Dei's opening of Spain to the forces of international capitalism, while at the same time opposing their elitism and authoritarianism. They feared that the Opus Dei would influence Franco to sell out their "revolution." The Opus Deistas were repulsed by what they viewed as aging, anachronistic and ideologically extreme Falangists. The ultranationalistic, even xenophobic Falangists were an obstacle to the Opus Dei's attempt to integrate authoritarian Spain into the international capitalist community.

This rivalry again exploded in 1969, when the regime's most shocking financial scandal, the MATESA affair, exploded, implicating a number of top Opus Dei politicians.[32] Opponents of the Opus within the National Movement attempted to exploit the scandal with zeal, denouncing it as evidence of the corruption of the Opus Dei technocrats. Manuel Fraga Iribarne, the Minister of Information and Tourism, and a man closely linked to the National Movement, saw to it that the details of the affair were leaked to the press and widely disseminated. In true franquist form, the resulting cabinet shift of October 1969 punished both those implicated in the scandal, and those responsible for exploiting it.

The rise to prominence of the Opus Dei created the conditions for Spain's economic "miracle" (1960-1970) and a decade of unprecedented social change, modernization, and disruption. A new middle class emerged in the cities, and a younger generation of Spaniards, with no civil war experience and few memories, entered the franquist bureaucracy.[33] Regional imbalances were exacerbated and the Church began a dramatic shift away from its previous support of the regime.[34] These developments intensified an already severe tension between franquist families, but such struggles were insignificant as long as Franco retained his power and prestige. The Caudillo was more than able to equilibrate the authoritarian coalition and to meet important challenges during the decade of the miracle. As his health began to deteriorate, however, the prospect of his absence began to loom large. Once again the succession dilemma, popularized in the question "Después de Franco, Qué?" ("After Franco, What?"), loomed large and was a cause for anxiety among the franquist political class. Ever the astute tactician, Franco realized that he could no longer risk postponing the appointment of a successor.

The Grooming of Two Successors

In the mid-1960's Franco began to prepare for his own absence. His regime had failed to create a strong single party: the National Movement remained an amorphous, largely bureaucratic patronage network, an elite recruitment arena, and a service organization for the dictator. The institutions of the regime were weak and almost entirely dependent on Franco. The essence of franquism continued to be the personal power of its leader. Without Franco, the future of authoritarian rule was highly questionable.

In 1969 Franco officially designated his successor for the position of head of state, bypassing the legitimate Bourbon heir and choosing instead his son, Juan Carlos.[35] One possible alternative would have been to groom a successor, slowly transferring some authority to him, and eventually bestowing on him all Franco's powers. Franco ruled out this possibility for the very reasons that had kept him in power so long: he remained totally opposed to the concept of power sharing, and was absolutely set on exercising power actively and directly. In retrospect it appears that Franco waited far too long to begin to transfer power to a possible successor, but this delay makes complete sense given the dictator's stubborn personality.[36] Indeed, Franco's delay in transferring any of his powers to Juan Carlos at that time was partly explained by another factor. He planned to groom two successors, probably because he realized that vesting his supreme power in one individual could be dangerous, and also because he was unwilling to give political control to any one monarch, thus depriving the more trustworthy military from a direct hand in political power.

The first real attempt to install a successor came in 1973 when Franco named Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco to the presidency of the government (prime minister), an office in existence since 1938, but officially vacant until 1973 (Franco exercised the powers of the presidency until then). In 1962, Franco had established the post of vice president of the government, with the provision that a future vacancy in the presidency would be filled by the vice president. The fact that Franco chose this route rather than simply naming somebody else as president illustrates the dictator's stubborn desire to maintain uncontested control of the regime. When Franco promoted Vice President Carrero Blanco to the presidency in 1973, as a sign that Carrero was his designated successor, he nevertheless did so with the understanding that his own vast

powers would remain intact. In fact, Franco continued to chair cabinet meetings up until his death in 1975.

Franco viewed Carrero Blanco as his "true" successor, and as the protector of franquist authoritarianism after his death. Carrero was widely known as a staunch authoritarian, a fierce anticommunist, and a close confidant of Franco. Like the Caudillo, Carrero Blanco had a deep disdain for democratic politics. Carrero's appointment to the presidency confirmed the fears and hopes of many that after Franco's death, franquism would indeed continue. By 1973, no Spanish politician other than Franco enjoyed the power and prestige of Carrero Blanco.

The Law of Succession had established that the future head of state would be a monarch. Franco had long since been grooming Juan Carlos to fill that position. Juan Carlos's father, Juan de Borbon (in exile in Portugal) was unacceptable to Franco because of his suspected liberalism, his repeated refusal to recognize the franquist regime's legitimacy (or to accept a restoration of an authoritarian monarchy), and his contacts with the democratic opposition. The Carlist royal family was ruled out since it too had been in exile for years. By the mid-1960's, the disgruntled Carlist movement had undergone a bizarre metamorphosis toward an *autogestión*-oriented socialism.

Although he was not designated successor until 1969, it seems clear that Juan Carlos was Franco's choice by at least 1960: Juan Carlos arrived in Spain in 1948, at the age of 10, and Franco had allowed Juan Carlos to attend a Spanish university and military academy in 1954. Franco feared that a premature announcement would provoke a hostile reaction from the Falangists, who still hoped for a permanent regency or a qaullist-type presidency. He also sought to avoid diluting his own power until the last possible moment.[37]

Contemplating a Carrero Blanco-Juan Carlos tandem, there can be little doubt that Franco felt confident that Carrero would be sufficient insurance against any deviations attempted by the young and inexperienced monarch. At the same time, Franco made every effort to ensure that the young Juan Carlos would not rock the boat after his coronation. He provided the prince with a solid franquist education and military training and treated Juan Carlos as a family member. He involved Juan Carlos in as much franquist pomp and circumstance as was possible, so as to identify him with the authoritarian regime. Juan Carlos, surely aware of

his future obligations, maintained an extremely low profile, complying with franquist protocol, but adhering to almost total silence.[38] This led many observers to view the future monarch as less than intelligent, even though in retrospect Juan Carlos's silence appears to have been a sign of utmost political shrewdness. A former deputy chief of the U.S. Mission in Spain recalls:

> [Juan Carlos] learned, at Franco's side but two steps to the rear, to be prudent and to participate in ceremonial functions. He did nothing to distinguish himself particularly or to presage how strong he would be or what he would try to achieve once he became King.[39]

Franco's choice of these two successors once again appeased almost all political families of the regime. The Opus Dei, perhaps the most influential family in the 1960's, pushed hard for the Carrero Blanco-Juan Carlos solution.[40] A young, politically neutral monarch, combined with a fiercely authoritarian, technocratic Opus Dei supporter, suited perfectly the Opus vision of a bureaucratic authoritarian monarchy. Although they hated and feared Carrero Blanco (and the dislike was mutual), the Falangists quickly accepted Juan Carlos as a potentially malleable compromise candidate, far more acceptable than either Don Juan de Borbon or the Carlist pretender. They placed their future bets on a reformed and more active National Movement, which the Falange might hope to dominate. The monarchists and Catholics, of course, were generally satisfied. The military had little faith in the young prince, but they had total confidence in Admiral Carrero Blanco.

The popularly "approved" 1967 Organic Law of State was aimed at putting the final touches on Franco's plans for leadership succession. The law attempted to complete the democratic facade covering the entirely authoritarian franquist institutions, but also more thoroughly defined the functions of the future presidency in preparation for Carrero's appointment.[41] Typically, however, the law was "so vague and imprecise on fundamental matters that it opened the way to antagonistic interpretations that accentuated pre-existent differences between the regime's political families."[42] The law was completely vague on such crucial matters as the future role of the National Movement.

The plan was now clear: Franco would appoint Carrero Blanco to the presidency as a first step in the succession process, and sometime thereafter, upon Franco's death, Juan Carlos would as-

sume the position of head of state. Carrero's age, his relationship to Franco, his long and unbroken experience in government, his prestige in the armed forces, and his own role in the designation of Juan Carlos, would all ensure the latter's dependent status. The young king, an apparently reserved and cautious individual, and a man close to both Franco and Carrero Blanco, would hardly be in the position to oppose the continuation of authoritarian rule.

The Incomplete Succession

Franco's leadership style always valued loyal individuals over more durable political institutions. He had taken steps to rationalize somewhat the arcane institutions of franquist authoritarianism, but he did little to give them the power and autonomy necessary for their continuation independent of top leaders. In looking to the future, Franco expected to pass his power directly to Carrero Blanco and Juan Carlos, not to a vigorous set of political institutions.

Carrero's first government appeared to confirm Franco's trust in the new president.[43] Carrero selected a strict law-and-order team, and his brief government was marked by a crackdown on the democratic opposition. Shortly after his appointment in June 1973, Carrero publicly interpreted the meaning of his presidency:

> What this appointment really means is that the Caudillo, because of his political prudence and his desire to institutionalize the regime step by step, has found it convenient to separate the institutions of head of state and head of government, in order to make sure that things are tied together and well tied together.[44]

Carrero's death at the hands of Basque terrorists in December 1973 threw a major wrench in Franco's plans for succession. It deprived the dictator of the only trustworthy franquist leader with the skills and prestige necessary to dominate the authoritarian coalition. Laureano López Rodó, a prominent Opus Dei cabinet member, reflected:

> More than one person was thinking, in front of the open casket of Luis Carrero, whether Franco hadn't been referring to that man when he said that "every loose end had been tied up, well tied up." . . . Carrero's death gave rise to the most profound political crisis of the entire franquist regime. None of the governmental shake-ups

since 1983 had reflected such a serious and irreversible turning point.[45]

Had Franco seriously placed faith in the franquist institutional structure, he would likely have appointed Vice President Torcuato Fernández-Miranda to replace Carrero. Fernández-Miranda was among the most prestigious Falangist intellectuals of the regime, and had been Juan Carlos's tutor.[46] He had been minister of the National Movement, where he had widespread support. Fernández-Miranda has an extremely enigmatic political career. He had worked with Carrero Blanco to kill attempts to liberalize the National Movement that would have allowed political associations within the organization, and would have given it more power. Like Carrero, he was unabashedly authoritarian, but he appeared to have been less beholden to Franco himself, and more realistic in assessing the future of the regime.

Even given these considerations, it was still a shock when Franco appointed Carlos Arias Navarro, a relatively political unknown, to the presidency. Arias had the advantage of being a pure franquist, since he was associated with none of the families. He had been a professional police administrator, a mayor of Madrid, and most recently the minister of the interior in the Carrero government. Arias had a reputation as a franquist hard-liner, and he enjoyed a close personal relationship with the dictator.

The prospect of Franco's death and succession to a new head of state suddenly presented itself as a crisis. A young and inexperienced monarch combined with a politically unknown president would be responsible for balancing the authoritarian coalition and guaranteeing the regime's continuity. While Franco remained on the scene, he could ensure political stability, but Franco's serious illness in 1974 cast doubt on his continuing ability to exercise influence.

The events of 1974 were almost a perfect illustration of both the dangers of authoritarian rule without Franco, and the ability of Franco to protect the regime while still active in politics. The year began with an attempt by Arias and his new government to invigorate the institutions of franquism, to allow for increased pluralism within the confines of the Movement, and to incorporate the new middle classes into the regime.[47] An unprecedented liberalization of the media and culture took place in the spring and sum-

mer of 1974, and Arias's government introduced a number of laws designed to reform the franquist political system

As Franco fell ill and Juan Carlos temporarily became head of state, the franquist coalition began to unravel in alarming fashion. The franquist hard-liners immediately began to assail the proposals for limited reform and denounced the atmosphere of liberalization.[48] Franquist reformers complained bitterly about the slow pace of change, the increased brutality of the police (especially in the Basque Country), and the continued veto power of hard-liners. The Catholic church, long a critic of aspects of the regime, and Catalan and Basque moderates, now launched frontal attacks on the Arias government. The military, frightened by the revolution in neighboring Portugal, became extremely skeptical about Arias.

Faced with these challenges from within the franquist coalition, Arias vacillated between reforms and repression. On the side of reform, he tolerated unprecedented press freedoms and spoke of continuing reform. On the side of repression, Arias sanctioned the arrest of the bishop of Bilbao (for giving a critical homily), the purging of the army chief of staff (a suspected liberal), and widespread arrests of opposition militants. When in September 1974 Franco regained his health and reassumed his powers, he promptly moved to sack the liberal members of Arias's government, thus ending any hope for a serious reform of the franquist system. From October 1974 to Franco's death in November of the following year, Spain experienced a political retrenchment in every area.

In short, Franco intervened late in the game and restored "order" to the franquist coalition, but it was a solution that could last only as long as the dictator. Arias's inability to maintain harmony within his own ranks had been clearly demonstrated. Franco's unwillingness to hand over powers of the chief of state permanently to Juan Carlos was another sign of the dictator's lack of faith in his successors. The weakness of Franco's strategy for succession was now apparent. After Franco, political power would continue to be personalized and highly concentrated, although in two individuals rather than a single dictator. However, with the power and prestige of *both* individuals in question, so was the regime's future. Moreover, Carrero's death and Arias's incompetence shifted more responsibility and power to the hands of Juan Carlos. Given the

prince's silence on all political matters, this fact increased the unease and uncertainty in Spain on the eve of Franco's death.

From Succession to Secession

For seven months after Franco's death it appeared that the franquist regime had pulled off an immaculate succession. Juan Carlos was crowned king without any public unrest, and in an atmosphere of total calm.[49] Leaders of the world's major democracies attended the coronation of the young monarch, and the new king made it absolutely clear that any change in the near future would be gradual. Moreover, Juan Carlos was forced to appoint Arias to the presidency, and many mistakenly viewed this decision as a sign that Juan Carlos actually *was* a dedicated franquist.[50] Supporters of the franquist regime gleefully affirmed that Spanish authoritarianism was far more than its Caudillo, and they dug in for a continuation of franquism without Franco.[51]

But without Franco and Carrero, the maintenance of the franquist coalition proved elusive. Arias, this time encouraged by the young monarch, once again pushed for a set of reforms that in its most recent version would create a Mexican-style authoritarian regime with some democratic elements. Some parties were to be legalized, and local and general elections were to be held. However, a powerful appointed upper house would guarantee the authoritarian features of the regime and the National Movement would retain its prominent role (its president would become president of the government). This timid plan immediately drew fire from members of the franquist coalition (in addition to the democratic opposition). Reformers within the government gave very liberal public interpretations of these plans, while Arias attempted to scale down their assessments by harping on the achievements of the deceased dictator and decrying the evils of "Western style" democracy.

The extreme Right, centered in the military and the National Movement, and encouraged by a rise in terrorism and mass mobilization, effectively torpedoed the major aspects of the Arias government's proposals. They did so by using the franquist institutions to oppose the president's proposed legislation, certainly a procedure that would never have been used to oppose Franco's legislation, and probably not to block Carrero's initiatives. Mean-

while the military grumbled about the lack of "order" in the country and opposition attacks on Franco's legacy.

Like Franco, Arias was not close to any regime family, but unlike the Caudillo, he was not respected by any of them. His authority emanated from his close relationship to Franco, and as his power eroded, he appealed increasingly to the late dictator's wishes to rationalize his own vacillation vis-à-vis the reform. This, in turn, convinced both regime reformers (the young bureaucrats of the National Movement, the more liberal Catholics, liberal monarchists) and the opposition that Arias was incapable of promoting even limited change. Forces on the Right, in turn, were convinced by Arias's authoritarian language and demeanor to dig in and oppose any and all reform.

The increasingly bitter struggle over Juan Carlos's head of government threatened to tarnish the young monarchy. In April 1976 Juan Carlos told a *Newsweek* reporter that Arias was "an absolute disaster."[52] As members of the opposition, press and even his cabinet contemplated Arias's resignation, each of the franquist families jockeyed for position. The franquist Right buried the Arias government's reform proposals in early June, when the historically passive corporatist legislature rejected the reform of the penal code, a basis for all of the other proposed reforms. This defeat effectively wiped out an earlier law permitting some political parties.

Arias resigned the presidency on 1 July 1976, at the king's request. His failure made it clear that Franco's successor as head of government needed to be able to forge a working coalition, and this entailed either gaining the support of regime hard-liners (as Carrero proved he could do) or winning the backing of regime moderates, reformers, and some parts of the democratic opposition.

Faced with the choice of a replacement for Arias, Juan Carlos basically had two options. He could try to appoint a franquist who might command the respect of the regime right, and who could therefore force the implementation of some limited reforms over their resistance. The difficulty with this approach was obvious: there were no other Carrero Blanco's within the franquist system, and by no coincidence. Franco had cautiously, and only very begrudgingly allowed a politician with Carrero's stature to emerge from within the ranks of the franquist elite. The second option was to elect a politician who could build a political coalition that

could govern *without* the participation of the extreme Right. Given the fact that power was still firmly in the hands of many of these hard-liners, notably the military, the syndical system and the bureaucracy, such a task was deemed extremely difficult if not impossible. It was unquestionably a gamble in which the future of the monarchy was at stake. The story of Juan Carlos's historic gamble in selecting the young and relatively unknown Adolfo Suárez, has been discussed elsewhere.[53] Suárez successfully built a political coalition composed of regime reformists and much of the democratic opposition. He first convinced the franquist Right to tolerate his limited reform of the franquist system, and then pushed the reform far past the limits promised to the hard-liners.[54] To the dismay of many regime die-hards who had placed their faith in the ex-minister of the National Movement, Suárez then led a large portion of the franquist in what may be called a regime "secession." The young president was eventually able to reshuffle these secessionists into the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD), the victorious coalition in the first two democratic general elections.[55]

In making the decision to appoint Suárez, Juan Carlos's deep-seated convictions may or may not have played a determining factor. It is likely that the answer to this question will never be known. But convictions aside, there are two reasons to believe that the nature of the franquist system in general, and the form of succession in particular, encouraged the king to take such a risk.

First, it is important to reiterate that Franco had never delegated much power to political institutions or subordinate leaders. As head of state, and as a politician appointed directly by Franco, Juan Carlos enjoyed the benefit of the doubt (although by no means unlimited license) from the franquist political class. The king thus gambled that with his first *real* choice for president, his authority and prestige would be on the line, and that most members of the franquist coalition would respect his wishes.[56]

Second, Franco had gained legitimacy for his regime, and for his role as dictator within the regime, in several ways. First, he was the leader of the Nationalist forces in the civil war. Second, he had ruled for forty years, and many respected his rule out of admiration at his sheer survival skills. Third, Franco had presided over a period of unprecedented economic growth in the 1960's. Fourth, Franco's rule was identified with peace, order and stabil-

ity, especially when compared with the turbulent Second Republic.

While Franco had "restored" the monarchy in Spain as early as 1947, Juan Carlos and the Bourbon monarchy enjoyed none of these forms of legitimacy. Juan Carlos was too young to have participated in the civil war, and he could hardly take credit for the perceived achievements of the franquist regime. In fact, the Bourbon monarchy suffered a negative image in Spain. Juan Carlos's grandfather had fled Spain in 1931, and had tainted the monarchy by collaborating with another dictator, General Primo de Rivera. Juan Carlos's father remained in exile for forty years, flirting with the democratic opposition, but politically impotent. Juan Carlos was widely dubbed "el breve" (the brief one) because his reign was not expected to last long. The young monarch was considered short on intelligence and rather awkward.

King Juan Carlos was no doubt encouraged to gamble with Adolfo Suárez in part to obtain a new and more enduring source of legitimacy for the Bourbon monarchy. Learning a lesson from both his grandfather and father, Juan Carlos knew that an authoritarian monarchy would have little future, and he was equally aware that the monarchy's refusal to collaborate with Franco's succession scheme would have been equally futile.

Franco planned to use the monarchy to avoid some of the pitfalls of leadership succession discussed in the first section of this article. He hoped that the prestige of the monarchical institution would help replace that of the Caudillo after his death. More importantly, coupled with a strong authoritarian guardian the likes of Carrero Blanco, an authoritarian monarchy was assumed by Franco to be feasible. Whether Franco was correct in this assumption is highly debatable, but is beside the point for the central argument of this article. The authoritarian monarch, sought by Franco, was never fully attempted, save the brief, halfhearted and totally incompetent effort of the Arias government. At any rate, it is clear that the establishment of an authoritarian monarchy, under Juan Carlos and Carrero, would have been difficult, and would surely have led to a higher degree of social and political conflict.

Conclusion

Succession for the posts of head of state and head of govern-

ment was carried out smoothly and efficiently both shortly before and shortly after Franco's death. There was no power vacuum, no mass disturbance, and no immediate crisis. Only in this sense did the succession function as planned.

Franco's plan to equip his regime with two successors who could safeguard the franquist legacy and continue authoritarian rule was a failure. King Juan Carlos, together with his President Adolfo Suárez, ultimately used their virtually unlimited power *within* the franquist regime to undermine authoritarian rule itself, rather than to adapt Spanish authoritarianism for another forty years of life. The charisma of the king and Suárez, their political skill in convincing recalcitrant sectors to support the process, and their good fortune, contributed immensely to the transition. While the first instance of succession in the franquist regime was intended to convert an authoritarian dictatorship into an authoritarian monarchy, it instead led to a parliamentary monarchy.

In explaining this failure, the role of generational factors was also crucial. Both the king and Suárez were part of a generation of Spaniards that had been less traumatized by the civil war experience.[57] This generational affinity made them ideal partners in the transition, and it also made them better negotiators with the young leaders of the democratic opposition. Ultimately, the generation gap rendered these younger franquists more willing to abandon the fundamental tenets of authoritarian rule, especially when compared with the older and more loyal Carrero and Arias. The political promiscuity of Suárez and the king eventually alienated a number of franquists (*e.g.,* Torcuato Fernández-Miranda) who had originally supported a moderate reform of the regime, and who had made important contributions to the transition process. Franco's appointees and institutions survived the dictator's death intact, but they could not bridge the generation gap created during forty years of authoritarian rule.

The Spanish case reminds us that even well-established and well-entrenched authoritarian regimes—and perhaps *especially* such regimes—are not exempt from the challenges posed by leadership succession. Every instance of leadership possession raises the specter of a fundamental reequilibration of the continuation of authoritarian rule.

The experience of the franquist regime reminds us that long-lived authoritarian leaders are especially difficult to replace without disintegrating the authoritarian coalition that has long sup-

ported such dictators. This conclusion appears to be even more valid where authoritarian leaders are directly linked to the regime's foundation, as was the case with Franco in Spain and Salazar in Portugal, and as is presently the case with Pinochet in Chile or Stroessner in Paraguay and Chiang-kuo in Taiwan. Such long-lived authoritarian regimes must ultimately contend with the challenge of a younger generation of leaders far less committed to basic principles of the regime, and far more open to the ideas of the opposition. As the Spanish case suggests, the younger generation can be kept from the highest positions of power for many years, but only at a considerable cost. The longer such newcomers are kept from power, the more willing they become to sabotage authoritarian rule when, inevitably, they ascend to positions of influence.

Those who seek democratization for authoritarian rule may be heartened by these conclusions, but they should be cautious in their optimism. Failed leadership successions, of which the Spanish case was only one example, may or may not lead to the construction of democracy. They may just as easily lead to authoritarian involutions that can result in far more repressive and less democratic regimes. Such an involution was sought by a significant sector of the Spanish armed forces and the political right throughout the Spanish transition to democracy. The foiled *golpe de estado* of February 1981 was only the most flamboyant and perilous example. However, it is clear that failed leadership successions in authoritarian regimes provide the political space within which democratic transitions *may* emerge, given a complex set of conditions. These have been discussed in more detail elsewhere as part of a growing literature on democratization from authoritarian rule.[58]

Notes

[1] Some of the research for this article was conducted as part of the author's doctoral dissertation, "Transition Through Transaction: The Politics of Democratization in Spain, 1975-1977" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Stanford University, 1983). Generalizations about authoritarian regimes contained herein are based mainly on the author's familiarity with the regions of Western Europe and Latin America.

[2] On the first four years of the PSOE government, see Donald Share, "Four Years of Socialist Government in Spain: Tensions and Successes in the Consolidation of Party and Regime" (Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 1986).

[3] Support for this statement is found in my "Democratization in Spain:

Searching for Explanations" (Delivered at the Ninth Annual European Studies Conference University of Nebraska at Omaha, 1984).

[4] This paper does not have as its focus the transition to democracy or the consolidation of democratic rule. Rather, the emphasis is on the dilemmas facing authoritarian regimes and the mechanisms through which they attempt to cope with changes of leadership.

[5] As noted in the concluding section of this article, this appears to make the Spanish case similar to the Portuguese case after Salazar, and contemporary Chile and Paraguay.

[6] On Spain's democratization after Franco see Donald Share, *The Making of Spanish Democracy* (New York: Praeger Publishers and the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1986).

[7] For a working definition of an authoritarian regime see Juan J. Linz, "Opposition in and Under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain" in *Regimes and Opposition*, ed. Robert Dahl (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 185.

[8] A good discussion is Maria Chang, "Playing Ostrich: Taiwan's Succession Predicament" (Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Eugene, Oregon, March 1986).

[9] Linz, "Opposition in and Under an Authoritarian Regime," p. 188.

[10] For an excellent discussion of authoritarian coalition management, see Philippe C. Schmitter, "Liberation by Golpe" in *Armed Forces and Society*, 1 (Fall 1975), 13-14.

[11] Salvador Giner, "Political Economy, Legitimation and the State in Southern Europe," *The British Journal of Sociology*, 2 (June 1982), 189.

[12] Linz, "Opposition in and Under an Authoritarian Regime," p. 193.

[13] For an illustration of this point from the Brazilian case, see Ronald M. Schneider, "The Brazilian Military in Politics" in *The New Militarism in Latin America*, ed. Robert Wesson (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1982), pp. 58-69.

[14] Marcello Caetano's ill-fated experience in Portugal, after Salazar became incapacitated, is an excellent illustration of this point. For a detailed description see Schmitter, "Liberation by Golpe."

[15] This point is elaborated in Adam Przeworski, "Notes on the Logic of the Transition to Democracy," presented at a workshop on "Prospects for Democracy: Transitions from Authoritarianism in Latin America and Latin Europe" (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 1979), p. 5.

[16] Schmitter, "Liberation by Golpe," p. 25.

[17] An outstanding analysis of this period is Juan Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain" in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe*, ed. Linz and A. Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978).

[18] Among the surprisingly few works on Franco are Francisco Franco Salgado, *Mis conversaciones privadas con Franco* (Madrid: Union, 1976) and Angel Bayod, ed., *Franco visto por sus ministros* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1981).

[19] Stanley Payne, *Franco's Spain* (New York: Thomas Cromwell, 1967), pp. 12-13, gives a cursory treatment of this period.

[20] Carlos R. Alba, "The Organization of Authoritarian Leadership: Franco Spain" in *Presidents and Prime Ministers*, ed. R. Rose and E. Suleiman (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1982), p. 259.

[21] Richard A. H. Robinson, *The Origins of Franco's Spain* (London: David and Charles, 1970).

[22] On franquist families, see Amando de Miquel, *Sociología del franquismo: analisis ideologico de los ministros del regimen* (Barcelona: Euros, 1975).

[23] On the Falange, see Stanley Payne, *Falange: A History of Spanish Fascism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961). On the creation of the National Movement, see Juan Linz, "From Falange to Movimiento-Organización: The Spanish Single Party and the Franco Regime, 1936-1968" in *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society* (New York: Basic Books, 1979).

[24] Payne, *Franco's Spain*, pp. 24-25.

[25] Two overviews of the period are contained in the historical works of Ignacio Fernandez Castro, *De las cortes de Cadiz al postfranquismo,* vol. 1 (Barcelona: El Viejo Topo, 1981) and Ricardo de la Cierva, *Historia del Franquismo* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1978).

[26] Linz, "Opposition in and Under an Authoritarian Regime," esp. pp. 188-94.

[27] For the more detailed analysis of the franquist families and their international disputes, see Share, *Making of Spanish Democracy*, chap. 3.

[28] Raymond Carr and Juan Pablo Fusi, *Spain: Dictatorship to Democracy,* 2nd ed. (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1981), pp. 168-74.

[29] The Opus Dei, literally "God's Work," is an international Catholic lay organization, shrouded in secrecy. In Spain, the members were mainly from the middle and upper classes, largely upwardly mobile professionals, and often technocrats. The Opus, whose founder was a Spaniard, gained tremendous influence in Spain during the 1950's and 1960's, by placing its members in positions of influence in universities, government and private enterprise. While the organization has no official ideology, its members in Spain were identified with a technocratic authoritarian mentality, that combined economic liberalism with political conservatism.

[30] For an overview of Spain's relations with the United States during franquism, see R. Rubottom and J. Murphy, *Spain and the United States* (New York: Praeger, 1984).

[31] A good treatment of political economic policy during franquism is Manual Jesus González, *Le economia politica del franquismo, 1940-1970* (Madrid: Tencos, 1979).

[32] MATESA was a textile conglomerate, found guilty of diverting huge amounts of state investment credits into bank accounts. Three Opus Dei ministers were directly implicated.

[33] On the first post-civil war generation, see Pablo Lizcano, *La generación del '56* (Barcelona: Grijalbo, 1981).

[34] On the growing regional imbalances see Charles W. McMillon, "International Integration and Intra-National Disintegration," *Comparative Politics* (April 1981). On the growing tension in church-state relations, see Norman B. Cooper, *Catholicism and the Franco Regime* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1974) and Stanley Payne, *Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).

[35] By far the most revealing reading on the designation of Juan Carlos as successor is Laureano López Rodó, *La larga marcha hacia la monarquia,* Seventh Edition (Barcelona: Plaza and Janes, 1979). López Rodó was a prominent Opus Dei minister in the 1960's and early 1970's, and was personally involved in the plans to name Juan Carlos as successor.

[36] During interviews with some of Franco's closest collaborators, conducted in 1981, the dictator's stubbornness on this matter was consistently noted. It appears that many franquist elites were increasingly concerned about the power vacuum that could develop after Franco's death, and they were interested in a speedy resolution of the matter. For further evidence on this point, see López Rodó, *La larga marcha,* pp. 570 ff.

[37] See Carr and Fusi, *Spain, Dictatorship to Democracy*, p. 172, for elaboration of this theme.

[38] Two works examine the difficult position of Juan Carlos before his coronation. See Victor Alba, *La soledad del Rey* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1981) and Joaquín Bardavío, *Los silencios del Rey* (Madrid: Strips, 1979).

[39] Samuel Eaton, *The Forces of Freedom in Spain, 1974-1979: A Personal Account* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1981), p. 31.

[40] See López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, for extensive evidence supporting this point.

[41] For more background on the political system of franquist Spain see Kenneth N. Medhurst, *The Government of Spain: The Executive at Work* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1973).

[42] Carr and Fusi, *Spain, Dictatorship to Democracy*, p. 180.

[43] On Carrero Blanco's first government, see López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, pp. 587-606.

[44] Quoted in Rafael Borrás Betriu, *El día en que mataron a Carrero Blanco* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1974), p. 194.

[45] López Rodó, *La larga marcha*, pp. 607-608.

[46] On Fernández Miranda, see José Luis Alcocer, *Fernández Miranda: Angonía de un Estado*, 2nd ed. (Barcelona: Planeta, 1986).

[47] On Arias and his reform attempt, see Alfonso Osorio, *Trayectoria política de un ministro de la corona*, 2nd ed. (Barcelona: Planeta, 1974), pp. 50-55.

[48] A more detailed discussion appears in Share, *Making of Spanish Democracy*, chap. 3.

[49] Eaton, *Forces of Freedom in Spain, 1974-1979*, gives an accurate description of this period.

[50] King Juan Carlos was virtually forced to appoint Arias, since the *terna* (a list of three nominees from which he must select the president) drawn up by the Council of the Realm included two more authoritarian candidates. Arias was the lesser of evils. See Stanley Payne, "The Political Transformation of Spain," *Current History*, 431 (1977), 14; and Victor Alba, *La soledad*, p. 256.

[51] See *ABC*, 2 and 6 December 1975, for some examples.

[52] *Newsweek*, 26 April 1976.

[53] Among the best works on Suárez are Gregorio Morán, *Adolfo Suárez: Historia de una ambición*, 3rd ed. (Barcelona: Planeta, 1979); Eduardo Chamorro, *Viaje al centro de UCD* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1981); Federico Ysart, *¿ Quién hizo el cambio?* (Barcelona: Argos Vergara, 1984).

[54] Suárez convinced conservative franquist politicians that the future political system would keep the Left from power, and that only through "transactive democratization" could their power be perpetuated. More importantly, he convinced the armed forces that the Communist party would not be legalized, and that the regional decentralization would be very limited. These important negotiations are discussed in Share, *Making of Spanish Democracy*, chap. 4.

[55] On the UCD, see Carlos Huneeus, *La Unión de Centro Demorático y la transición a la democracia en España* (Madrid: Centro de investigaciones Sociológicas, 1985; and Emilio Attard, *Vida y muerte de UCD* (Barcelona: Planeta, 1983).

[56] That Juan Carlos took a large gamble in appointing Suárez is often forgotten. In fact, the initial public reaction to Suárez's selection was very negative. Only the franquist Right seemed satisfied by the naming of the ex-secretary general of the National Movement. The democratic opposition and the press viewed the king's move as too timid.

[57] See Lizcano, *La generación del '56*.

[58] Among the most important works are Julián Santamaría, ed., *Transición a la democracia en el sur de Europa y América Latina* (Madrid: Centro de Investiga-

ciones Sociológicas, 1981); Francisco Orrego Vicuña, ed., *Transición a la democracia en América Latina* (Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano, 1985); Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe and Latin America* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Donald Share and Scott Mainwaring, "Transitions Through Transactions: Democratization in Brazil and Spain" in *Political Liberalization in Brazil,* ed. Wayne A. Selcher (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986).