Democratization from authoritarian rule has been an important focus of scholarly interest in the 1980s. However, no typology of democratic transitions currently exists. This article introduces a typology of transitions from authoritarianism to democracy with four major types: incremental democratization, transition through rupture, transition through protracted revolutionary struggle, and transition through transaction. The remainder of the article discusses the conditions for one type of democratic transition, transition through transaction, in Spain (1975-1978). As the Spanish case suggests, the conditions for this type of transition are quite different from those required for other forms of transition. The summary discussion of the Spanish case is divided into a consideration of the conditions for the initiation of transition through transaction, and an examination of the conditions for the implementation of transition through transaction. Both sections emphasize the crucial role of elite attitudes and skill in transitions through transaction.

TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY AND TRANSITION THROUGH TRANSACTION

DONALD SHARE
University of Puget Sound

Democratization from authoritarian rule has been one of the most intensely studied topics of the 1980s.[1] Students of comparative politics have explored the erosion of authoritarian rule, the conditions for democratic transition, the process of democratic regime change, the foundation and consolidation of new democracies, and the consequences of democratic transition for the future of democratic rule.

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This concern about democratization follows a decade of scholarly inquiry into the difficulties confronting democratic rule in both the developed and developing world, and ultimately, the nature of and causes for its breakdown. The shifting focus is partly explained by contemporary political developments. From the mid-1960s until the early-1970s "liberal" notions of democratic rule came under attack, with the end of democracy in such developing nations as Argentina, Greece, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Not surprisingly, scholarly attention was directed to the economic, social, and international constraints obstructing democratic rule in less developed nations. The "dependency" literature, by explaining how internal and external forms of political economic domination undermined democracy in dependent countries, was especially influential.[2]

This return to democracy in Latin Europe (Greece and Portugal in 1974 and Spain after 1975) and Latin America (Peru in 1980, Bolivia and Argentina in 1982, and Brazil more recently) kindled a renewed interest in democratization. Unlike the "political development" literature of the past, with its emphasis on the maintenance of stable democracy, or with its selective focus on the "classical" models of democratic evolution (England and Sweden), the recent writings have focused more narrowly on the *genesis* of democratic rule. These writings have given rise to what may be seen as a cautious optimism about the possibilities for democratic rule, in marked contrast to the scholarly pessimism of the previous decade.

The new writings on democratization have, with some exceptions, heeded the warnings of Dankwart Rustow, issued more than 10 years ago (Rustow, 1970). Democracy's genesis has been studied separately from the functional requisites for its maintenance. Explanations of democratization have attempted to pinpoint causes rather than draw attention to correlations. Emphasis on structural variables (the international system, the class structure, economic performance, and political institutions) has not displaced concern about political strategy, skill, and beliefs. There has been a recognition that more than one road leads to democratic rule, and that such roads will vary depending on historical and contextual factors. Finally, Rustow was correct when he predicted that "The study of democratic transitions will take the political scientist deeper into history than he/she has commonly been willing to go" (Rustow, 1970: 347).

Surprisingly, despite the attention recently attributed to the question of democratization from authoritarian rule, there has been little effort to

develop a typology of democratic transitions.[3] Attempts to develop theoretical explanations for the emergence of democratic rule have failed in part because the universe of transitions to democracy is so large and diverse. This article proposes a broad typology of democratic transitions from authoritarian rule. It argues that such a typology is necessary for any examination of the conditions for democratic transition, since the conditions for each subtype are likely different. In order to illustrate this point, the article will briefly discuss one subtype, referred to here as "transition through transaction," drawing on the Spanish case in particular. It will be argued that the conditions for Spain's transition through transaction differed from those associated with the most common subtype, "transition through rupture."

SOME PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS

This article is concerned with transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes. By regime, I mean the formal and informal structure of governmental roles and processes. Included within this concept of regime are methods of inauguration of governments, formal and informal representative mechanisms, and patterns of coercion. Authoritarian regimes will be defined as political systems with significant procedural proscriptions on political contestation or inclusiveness. The notion of democracy employed here will be Robert Dahl's definition of polyarchies, or "regimes that have been substantially popularized and liberalized, that is highly inclusive and extensively open to public contestation" (Dahl, 1971: 8). More concretely, democracies must provide for (1) free and contested elections for the selection of political representatives, (2) basic civil rights, and (3) clearly established "rules of the game" that protect these democratic liberties. Thus this article adopts a relatively narrow, easy to operationalize, and procedurally oriented definition of democracy.

It should be noted from the start that a common problem facing students of the transition to democracy is defining its chronological parameters. It is often observed that the transition to democracy may have its roots deep within the process of change during the authoritarian regime. For example, the political thaw of the 1960s in franquist Spain clearly contributed to the emergence of forces favoring democratic rule. For the purposes of this article, such easing of repression and

restoration of civil liberties will be termed "liberalization." Democratization will refer to the establishment of institutions and procedures that allow for all three aspects of our definition of democracy. Liberalization of an authoritarian regime may or may not occur prior to democratization.[4]

Just as it is hard to mark the beginning of the process of democratic transition, it is also difficult to define its end point. The transition to democracy may be viewed as complete when democratic procedures, rights, and rules of the game have been clearly delineated and widely accepted by a majority of elites and citizens. In many democratic transitions, such as post-World War II West Germany or contemporary Brazil, the end of the transition process is more difficult to define, since direct popular endorsement of the newly established rules of the game may be postponed or delayed indefinitely. Even in the Spanish transition to democracy, where the 1978 referendum demonstrated an overwhelming popular approval of a new constitution, some considered the transition incomplete until the regime experienced its first alternation of power in 1982.

Although it is useful to delimit beginning and end of the transition to democracy for analytical purposes, such artificial boundaries are necessarily imperfect. The boundaries between the breakdown of authoritarian rule and the initiation of democratization are often blurred. Likewise, the process of democratization often overlaps with the consolidation, institutionalization, and early maintenance of a new democratic regime.

A TYPOLOGY OF TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY

Two caveats are in order before proposing a typology of transitions to democracy.[5] First, this exercise will only consider transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy, using the strict definitions of both terms introduced in the previous section. Thus, the universe of postcolonial democracies that have evolved after periods of neither authoritarianism nor complete democracy (for instance, the United States) are not considered here. Second, the typology establishes ideal-types, recognizing that most historical cases of democratic transition may manifest characteristics of more than one form of democratization.

In developing the typology of transitions to democracy, illustrated in Figure 1, two classificatory questions were asked. First, is the democratic transition brought about with the participation or consent of leaders of the authoritarian regime, or does it transpire without such participation or consent? Transitions which enjoy the support of authoritarian rulers may be termed consensual. According to Giovanni Sartori (1976: 275), these types of transitions occur "whenever they can be imputed to the working principles or to the rules of the game, inherent in that system. In short, continuous change amounts to self-change, to transformations resulting from, and permitted by, the inner constituent mechanisms of each political structure." This support for democratization can be manifest in two ways: Authoritarian leaders may simply tolerate democratic political change, refraining from active stewardship over it; or they actively participate in the process of change, hoping thereby either to control and limit such change, or to forestall more distasteful change.

Consensual transitions entail at least some degree of political continuity between the authoritarian and democratic period. Because authoritarian elites are willing and able to allow the birth of democratic rule—and are partly or largely responsible for its genesis—the legitimacy of the authoritarian and democratic regimes are not mutually exclusive. Consensual transitions are able to foster simultaneously "backward" and "forward" legitimation; democratic rule is established upon, not at the expense of authoritarianism.[6] Thus consensual transitions usually avoid open confrontation between supporters of authoritarian and democratic rule, and may gain adherents from both camps. Logically, in such cases one would expect to detect democratic features within the preceding authoritarian regime, as well as nondemocratic vestiges in the succeeding democracy.

Transitions to democracy that are initiated without the consent or cooperation of authoritarian rulers may be termed nonconsensual. In nonconsensual transitions to democracy, the legitimacy of authoritarian and democratic rule are mutually exclusive: Support for authoritarian rule cannot be reconciled with acceptance of a democratic regime. In such cases, authoritarian leaders, out of ignorance, incompetence, sheer stubbornness, or some mixture thereof, oppose the transition to democracy. They may stifle attempts by political forces to initiate it, or they may simply neglect to place the question of democratic rule on the political agenda. Either way, when democratization results, it is at the expense of the legitimacy of authoritarian rule. The resulting



Figure 1: Types of Democratization from Authoritarian Rule

democracy will likely eschew the support—and may actively prohibit the participation—of political forces linked with the authoritarian past. Purges, deportation, imprisonment, and other proscriptions are the mark of nonconsensual transitions. Severe discontinuities between authoritarian and democratic periods are often manifest in political institutions, political symbols, political culture, and even socioeconomic arrangements.

A second question regarding the universe of transitions to democracy concerns the duration of the transition. Does the transition to democracy occur gradually, transcending a single generation of political leaders, or is it a relatively rapid phenomenon? This question has both theoretical implications, that will be become apparent below, and practical importance. As Dahl has noted, *incremental democratization* of the consensual type is increasingly impractical in the contemporary world, where mass communications, combined with the demonstration effect, make an incremental opening of the political process extremely difficult to affect (Dahl, 1971: 39). Likewise, the incremental growth of democratic oppositions in the face of rigidly authoritarian regimes *(protracted revolutionary struggles)* seems to be the perfect breeding

ground for revolutionary movements, seldom dominated by forces adhering to the definition of democracy established here.[7]

For these reasons, it seems likely that the interest both of political leaders and scholars will emphasize rapid transitions to democracy. Despite their apparent desirability, rapid transitions to democracy present some real difficulties. The speed with which the rules of the game shift from democratic to authoritarian notions of power opens the door for political instability. The problems associated with rapid transitions differ according to whether they are consensual *(transitions through transaction)* or nonconsensual *(transitions through rupture)*. Some of these difficulties will be discussed in the following section.

While incremental transitions have been the most studied, they are not the most common. Outside of the United Kingdom and some northern European cases, there are few cases of incremental democratization. Most modern democracies have resulted from transition through rupture. Within this category, four subtypes of democratic transition can be differentiated. Most democracies in this category were produced by the collapse of the preceding authoritarian regime, usually because of defeat and occupation by a foreign power. Many of the democracies of postwar Western Europe, along with Japan, illustrate this subtype. A second subtype, extrication, occurs when authoritarian regimes experience a sudden loss of legitimacy, and abruptly hand power over to the democratic opposition. The recent events in Argentina, and possibly those in Peru in 1980, serve as examples. Transition through rupture may also take the form of a coup, in which the authoritarian regime is dislodged from power by an elite group within the military or police forces. The Portuguese transition, at least in its initial phase, is an example of this subtype, since a group of young, disaffected military officers toppled the Salazar-Caetano regime. Finally, transitions through rupture may come about via mass mobilization, or revolution, of which the French Revolution serves as a prototype.

Although transitions through rupture may take many forms, their nonconsensual nature, and their rapidity, make them similar for analytical purposes. Transitions through rupture all involve the repudiation, or at least significant delegitimation of, the extinct authoritarian regime. Often, the ability to delegitimate the previous regime is all that gives legitimacy to the emerging regime. Consequently, the regimes emerging from these transitions almost always attempt to purge those implicated with authoritarian rule from positions of importance.

Punishment for past abuses, including imprisonment, exile, and occasionally public trials, are characteristically part of such transitions. Symbolic measures, such as the change of street names or banning of cultural works associated with the authoritarian period, will be undertaken both to further discredit the previous regime, and to reward psychologically the opponents of authoritarian rule.

There are two general sets of drawbacks associated with transitions through rupture. Most obviously, it is apparent that the conditions for such transitions do not often or readily emerge in contemporary cases of authoritarian rule. The total collapse of authoritarian regimes has most often come about through military defeat. While such an eventuality is not impossible, as the Argentine debacle recently demonstrated, military defeat cannot be expected to undermine authoritarian rule very often. Moreover, the dangers of such a form of collapse in the nuclear age need not be emphasized.

Even in cases of extrication, where the authoritarian regime has not completely collapsed, but in which its legitimacy has been critically eroded, serious drawbacks are evident. In this set of cases, the legitimacy of authoritarian rule is most often undermined by a set of conditions that may also obstruct the consolidation of democratic rule. Severe economic crisis, or a foreign policy catastrophe, can easily encourage the military to run for the shelter of the barracks, while bestowing on the democratic opposition a series of unsolvable problems.

Likewise, military coups may destroy authoritarian rule, but they inevitably politicize (and usually divide) the military. As the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement demonstrated, the consequences of a politicized military may be unfavorable for democratic rule, and can even directly threaten democracy. In addition, military coups always involve some possibility of political violence, and may create the conditions for the victory of hardline sectors (rightist or leftist) in the armed forces.

Democratization through protracted revolutionary struggle is conceivable, but there are reasons to suspect that its occurrence will be rare. The protracted nature of a revolutionary struggle usually indicates the presence of a particularly intransigent and powerful authoritarian regime, or a revolutionary opposition whose aspirations do not conform to the definition of democracy advanced earlier, or both. Of course, in some cases the intransigence or repressiveness of an authoritarian regime is encouraged by a persistent undemocratic revolutionary opposition. Also, an initially democratic opposition may abandon its faith in democratic procedures when faced with an intransigent

authoritarian regime. These two factors have often fed on each other, producing a vicious cycle of intolerance and intransigence that hardly augurs well for the emergence of democratic rule. Although revolutionary movements may be able to dislodge authoritarian regimes and install democratic rule, the likelihood of such an outcome would appear to be minimal.[8] The recent events in Nicaragua appear to lend support to this argument.

Logically, it is to transitions through transaction that many have turned in search of a form of democratization that is peaceful and rapid.[9] Unfortunately, transition through transaction demands a particularly restrictive set of conditions that may not appear in most authoritarian regimes.[10] Perhaps the most difficult prerequisite is the authoritarian regime's *willingness to initiate* the transition to democracy. After all, as Philippe Schmitter (1979: 7) has pondered,

> If by changing [regime leaders] would incur a high risk of failure (not to mention personal injury), why would regime forms change at all? Why would they not merely perpetuate themselves indefinitely through marginal alterations in policy and occasional circulations in elites?

Adam Przeworski (1979: 4) notes that "The most difficult question is what would make [the dominant groups of the regime] decide to begin the process of transition, or perhaps more realistically, what would make them tolerate any articulation of pressures for transition."

A second question concerns the authoritarian regime's *ability to implement* transition through transaction. Sartori (1976: 276) suggests that "the pertinent question is whether [authoritarian and democratic] systems *can* be converted into one another without breakdown, i.e., continuously, via inner transformation." Leaders of transitions through transaction confront a plethora of obstacles. Authoritarian hardliners will almost certainly oppose democratization, or at least seek to limit it in ways unacceptable to the democratic opposition. The democratic opposition will not readily accept a transition to democracy led by members of a regime that only recently persecuted it. Dahl (1971) notes that such transitions can easily be undermined by forces within the regime or democratic opposition:

> . . . the search for a system of mutual guarantees is likely to be complex and time consuming. During the transition, when conflict erupts, neither side can be entirely sure that it will be safe to tolerate the other. Because

> the rules of the political game are ambiguous, and the legitimacy of competitive politics is weak, the costs of suppression may not be inordinately high. The danger is, then, that before a system of mutual security can be worked out among the contestants, the emerging but precarious competitive regime will be displaced by a hegemony ruled by one of the contestants [pp. 38-39].

On the societal level, the prospect of democratization will almost certainly release pent-up demands for economic, social, cultural, and political change.[11] The heightened politicization and mobilization of society may frighten and threaten authoritarian hardliners. On the elite level, the initiation of transition through transaction may unravel the authoritarian coalition, as some elites abandon ship with eyes to a future democratic system, while others maneuver against the reformist leadership or dig in for a last stand. In short, this type of democratization "poses an enigma that severely tests the ingenuity of the 'social engineers' who offer their expertise to accomplish a task which amounts to squaring a circle" (O'Donnell, 1979a: 315).

THE CONDITIONS FOR TRANSITION THROUGH TRANSACTION IN SPAIN

By providing a brief overview of how the circle was squared in Spain after Franco, it is possible to highlight the difficult conditions for transition through transaction, and to illustrate this most interesting subtype. The following discussion is a highly abridged version of arguments appearing elsewhere (Share, 1984; Share and Mainwaring, 1986).

For analytical purposes, it is useful to divide the discussion according to conditions facilitating the initiation of transition through transaction and conditions facilitating its implementation. A third area of importance, the conditions for the consolidation of transition through transaction, will not be dealt with here, although it has received important treatment elsewhere.[12]

THE INITIATION OF TRANSITION THROUGH TRANSACTION

Unlike some Latin American authoritarian regimes, where military rule may perform a "caretaker" function, the franquist regime declared

no original intentions to democratize. Franquism was the antithesis of parliamentary democracy: It eliminated all parties and democratic institutions, ended the regional autonomy established under the Republic, and abolished all of the political symbols associated with the democratic period. While in the 1960s there were attempts to introduce a modicum of democratic discourse and behavior, such measures never went beyond what the Portuguese refer to as *para ingles ver* (show for the English). The facade democracy of the late franquist period may have reflected the increasing legitimacy of democratic symbols and procedures, but it did not symbolize a commitment on the part of the franquist elite to democratize.

Nor can the decision to democratize be understood solely in terms of "imperatives" brought about by any combination of economic crisis, mass pressure, or the international environment.[13] In its twilight, the franquist regime was faced with numerous challenges: the increasingly politicized and militant working class, a democratic student movement, a rejuvenated and increasingly unified political opposition, a hostile and partially radicalized Church, an inhospitable international environment, and most visibly, the persistent terrorist violence.[14] These challenges were a sign of the eroding legitimacy of authoritarian rule, but they were never successful in toppling the franquist regime. Ironically, the regime's unusual sense of security appears to have facilitated its willingness to tolerate a transition through transaction. Franquism consistently demonstrated an ability to contain direct threats to its existence. While the regime's reservoir of active support dwindled as the dictator's death became imminent, the multifarious challenges were more than offset by a combination of passive tolerance of authoritarian rule and selective repression.

Nevertheless, the changing socioeconomic environment of Spanish authoritarianism did form the context within which democratic change took place. While the regime's ability to survive any short-term challenge was never in question, the erosion of popular support for authoritarian rule surely weighed heavily in the minds of those responsible for initiating the transition to democracy. Rapid economic growth had modified somewhat the composition of the franquist coalition, without seriously eroding its commitment to authoritarian rule. For example, an important sector of the Catholic Church began to distance itself from the franquist regime in the 1960s, responding to changes in both the domestic and international environment. This loss, however, was more than compensated for by the rise of the Opus Dei technocrats, a group of economically liberal but politically authoritar-

ian Catholics.[15] This shift in the franquist elite directly contributed to Spain's economic liberalization in the 1960s, and was initially accompanied by a small and temporary move toward political liberalization. The more technocratic orientation of Spanish cabinets in the 1960s and early 1970s, however, did not lead to a democratization of the regime, even in the context of spectacular economic growth, and even after the Spain's southern European neighbors (Portugal and Greece) experienced democratic transitions.

Macro-level structural factors played a much larger role as after transition through transaction was initiated. Mass support for democratization provided an invaluable prop for the transition's leaders, in both the reformist franquist sector and the democratic opposition. As will be argued below, both franquist reformists and opposition elites stood much to lose by embracing the contradictory and counterintuitive strategy of transition through transaction. Widespread popular enthusiasm for the Suárez strategy helped allay their reticence. As these same leaders attempted to consolidate the transition to democracy, by writing a new constitution, by reaching accords on the major socioeconomic issues facing post-Franco Spain, and by building a new party system, the importance of macro-level structural changes became even more apparent. The presence of a large middle class, unwilling to embrace political extremism of any type, clearly facilitated the writing and approval of a consensual constitution, agreement on consociational arrangements for the resolution of major economic issues, and the establishment of a moderate party system capable of peaceful alternation.

However, rather than focusing on long-standing democratic intentions, direct challenges to authoritarian rule, or the changing socioeconomic context (all of which are important but hardly crucial), the initiation of transition through transaction in Spain is best understood with reference to the internal political dynamics of the franquist coalition. During Franco's life, a diverse set of interests were kept in balance by the dictator's political skill, power, and charisma. The "families" of franquism (the Church, the National Movement, the Opus Dei, the monarchists, the military) differed considerably on economic, social, and political policy.[16] They had diverse views of how Spain's authoritarian system should be adapted to post-Franco reality. As long as Franco retained an active and direct role in politics—and this was the case for most of his life—these intrafamilia disputes were of little consequence. Even in the early 1970s, when a moribund Franco began

to transfer some of his power to his trusted colleague, President Luis Carrero Blanco, the authoritarian coalition remained essentially intact.[17]

Carrero's assassination in 1973 threw the regime into a serious political crisis. With Franco ailing, and with the elimination of franquism's guardian, the authoritarian coalition began to unravel. Different families, and different factions and individuals within families, began to struggle for control of the transition. Transition through transaction was initiated out of the internal political struggle of the franquist coalition. The outcome of this struggle was determined more by *virtu* and *fortuna* than any necessity rooted in macro-level changes in the economic, social, cultural, or international environment.

It is easy enough to demonstrate that transition through transaction might *not* have been the result of the internal political struggle of the franquist regime. The first response by franquist elites to the death of Franco and the coronation of King Juan Carlos was not to implement transition through transaction. Rather, the King's first president (also Franco's last president), Carlos Arias Navarro, attempted to implement some liberal reforms without altering the authoritarian basis of the regime. While his plan enjoyed considerable initial support, it failed for a number of reasons.

Most important, Arias lacked the skill and will to initiate reform, even a plan as timid as his own. His attachment to his thoroughly franquist past, his close personal friendship with Franco, his deep-seated distrust of democratic politics, and his personal vacillations, all handicapped his reform program. Arias lacked the will and skill to impose his reform over the resistance of hardliners, and he was unable to convince a skeptical democratic opposition of his sincerity. At the same time, Arias was unable to build a solid coalition in support of his project. His proposals (combined with his government's intransigent behavior) alienated the opposition and incited the regime right. He could not even maintain intact his own government, which was seriously split over the pace and extent of political reform.

Arias's failure led to his removal, but more important, it discredited the option of a *democracia a la española*. Arias's successor, Adolfo Suárez, would have stood a far better chance of initiating a mild reform of franquism, similar to the Arias plan. By the time Suárez was appointed, however, the reformist option was exhausted, the political climate of the country was tense, and both the democratic opposition and regime right were becoming impatient.

It was in this context of increasing tension and impatience that King Juan Carlos appointed a relative political unknown to the presidency, Adolfo Suárez. It is very likely that the choice of Suárez was largely motivated by the King's desire to speed up the democratic reform.[18] Juan Carlos no doubt realized that a prolonged failure to democratize the franquist system would discredit the new monarchy. To the extent that some future Spanish system would be democratic (the odds of which were perceived as being high), the monarchy's existence would require that the King identify himself (and the institution he represented) with democratization. It is worth recalling that the Bourbon monarchy in Spain had an inauspicious reputation. The Bourbons presided over the calamitous decline of Spain's empire, and the monarchy was directly implicated in the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923-1930). Franco's "restoration" of the monarchy in 1947 identified the institution with authoritarianism even further. For most members of the democratic opposition, the ability of the monarchy to coexist with democratic rule was seriously doubted.

It was therefore in the King's best interest to break the impasse created by the Arias government. Conceivably, Juan Carlos could have opted for an equally authoritarian but more competent successor to Arias. It seems likely that Spanish authoritarianism, with some further reforms, could have sustained itself for an extended period. In fact, the surprise appointment of the former leader of the National Movement led many Spaniards to suspect that Juan Carlos *had* opted for such a strategy.

Instead, the young monarch gambled on a democratic future for Spain, although he left it to his new president to bring about such a difficult and risky transition. Given this choice, the king understood that the institution of the monarchy must identify itself with the transition process, were it to survive the transition.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSITION THROUGH TRANSACTION

As the failure of the Arias reform illustrated, the desire to enact democratic change does not ensure successful implementation. Leaders of an authoritarian regime face numerous obstacles when attempting to implement transition through transaction. Nevertheless, Suárez fulfilled three conditions that help to explain how he disproved almost unanimous predictions of failure.

First, *a degree of support or toleration for political reform was mustered from the most powerful members of the authoritarian coalition.* In transition through transaction, a coalition of regime forces favoring (or at least tolerating) democratic change must be cultivated. In Spain, this meant that the military hierarchy, as well as the most powerful political leaders within the franquist system, had to be convinced to support democratization.

Suárez worked methodically and diligently to satisfy this condition. Immediately after his appointment, he initiated an extensive series of contacts with virtually all representatives of regime factions and opposition groups. Within the regime, Suárez reassured the military of limits to the reform—albeit in ambiguous and easily betrayed terms—and he convinced important regime elites to support his project as the best solution possible to the succession crisis. By respecting the legal framework of franquism, and by adhering to the institutional rules of authoritarianism, Suárez and the King were able to win the initial support, or at least the benefit of the doubt, of most of the franquist elite.

It is imperative to note that the presence and behavior of King Juan Carlos was paramount to Suárez's ability to gain support within the regime. For regime supporters, the King embodied the legitimacy of the franquist system. Even the most hardline franquists were hesitant to oppose Franco's hand picked successor, since opposition to the monarch would be tantamount to an admission that the *Caudillo* had erred. In fact, many hardliners eventually came to view the appointment of Juan Carlos as a mistake, but only after Suárez's reform had reached an advanced stage. Like Suárez, the monarch played his role to perfection by constantly reassuring the regime right, in word and in deed, that he would continue to act as the guardian of franquism. His strict participation in franquist ritual, his deferential treatment of franquist elite, and his incessant assurances that there would be no attempt to wipe the slate clean, contributed immensely to Suárez's success. While the presence of such an exceptional head of state is not necessary for successful transitions through transaction, there can be no question that these transitions are far more difficult without such well respected and talented leaders.[19]

Second, *the democratic opposition, or at least sectors of it, had to be convinced to participate in the resulting system.* In transitions through transaction, opposition leaders must somehow be assured that they will have a role to play in the future system, and that they will enjoy

increasing freedom to operate. In the Spanish case, this requirement entailed winning the confidence of the disparate opposition groups, some of which were highly radicalized and hostile toward regime leaders. Moreover, this confidence had to be obtained while the entire franquist apparatus, including the security forces, remained intact. In fact, the independent behavior of the security forces was a constant source of tension between the regime and opposition.

Nevertheless, Suárez quickly won the opposition's admiration and respect for his willingness to dialogue and for his flexibility. The difference between Arias and Suárez was immediately evident to opposition leaders, and they soon indicated their satisfaction with the improvement.[20] Suárez's ability to push his Political Reform Law through the franquist system encouraged them to weaken their opposition to the principle of transition through transaction. By the end of 1976, many opposition leaders had come to accept the Suárez reform as the only possible route to democracy. This change in the opposition's posture was neither easy nor complete, but the thawing of regime-opposition relations gave Suárez the momentum necessary to complete the reform.

Suárez's personal attributes were uniquely appropriate for the task of convincing key sectors of the franquist regime and the democratic opposition to accept transition through transaction. For many franquists, Suárez's credentials as leader of the National Movement, his career in the franquist bureaucracy, and his experience in the Cabinet under Arias, all made him appear a trustworthy ally. For opposition democrats, Suárez's youth, his ability to dialogue with individuals of diverse ideological persuasion, and his modern political style, eventually convinced the opposition that, unlike Arias, Suárez was more a man of the future than a politician of the past. Most important, Suárez had no personal ties to the Spanish Civil War or the violent origins of the franquist regime. He therefore faced opposition elites not as a regime founder, but as a young franquist career bureaucrat. In fact, Suárez felt far more comfortable dealing with his generational peers than with most of his colleagues in the franquist regime.[21]

Opposition elites also contributed a great deal to the successful implementation of transition through transaction. A more intractable and less prudent opposition might have undermined Suárez's effort. For example, Carrillo's attempt to force the PCE's legalization, by appearing suddenly in Madrid, almost had disastrous consequences for the entire reform project. Carrillo apparently learned this lesson well since

his party never again attempted to use provocation to exact concessions from the Suárez government. A more confrontational attitude by the opposition, in reaction to the massacre of leftist labor lawyers in February 1977, could have had similar consequences. Refusal on the part of the PSOE to participate in the first democratic elections could have imperilled the transition. A hostile campaign against the monarchy, or against Suárez himself, would surely have alarmed the franquist right and sectors of the military. A more triumphal reaction by democratic forces to the legalization of the Communist Party, or the dismantling of the National Movement and Syndical Organization, could have endangered Suárez's reform at delicate moments.

The ability of opposition elites, regardless of ideological persuasion, to act responsibly in a difficult environment had several explanations. First, opposition elites were well aware of the dangers entailed by the failure of the Suárez reform. After all, many of them had suffered under authoritarian rule. The opposition was aware that a popular insurrection to topple the regime was extremely unlikely. While on the eve of Franco's death much of the opposition adhered to the notion of a *ruptura democrática*, many opposition leaders acknowledged the need for an alliance with reformist sectors of the regime. Nevertheless, opposition leaders were constantly challenged by the fear that they might be outflanked by radical groups who could successfully accuse them of collaborationism, and by making such accusations gain support among newly politicized sectors.

Third, and directly related to the first two conditions, regime leaders had to *maintain enough control* over the political situation to allow for a rapid yet orderly transition. The Spanish leadership had to be able to resist pressure from the regime right for an authoritarian involution, and calls from the leftist opposition for a democratic break. This required a delicate equilibrium between an adherence to the basic rules of the authoritarian regime and a well-planned and incrementally implemented set of democratic reforms. In discussing the general dilemmas facing leaders of transitions through transaction, O'Donnell (1979a: 30) provides an almost exact description of Suárez's difficult situation during the Spanish transition:

> In these circumstances, it is evident that the demands on the quality of political leadership are extraordinarily severe. There is not only the problem of deciding at critical junctures which are the fundamental issues

and adversaries, but also of being able to convince followers and opponents that the leaders' tactical flexibility is only an instrument which is guided by a firm sense of direction toward democratization.

Between July 1976 and June 1977, Suárez implemented key aspects of his reform plan. While not every facet of the reform was foreseen ahead of time, and although Suárez appears to have improvised a great deal, the reforms were surprisingly well staggered and timed. A simple chronology of the major highlights of the reform illustrates this point. The reform began with the limited amnesties in the summer of 1976, and continued through the constitutional reform of November, the referendum in December, the legalization of most political parties in early 1977, the legalization of the PCE in April, and the dismantling of important franquist institutions (notably the National Movement and the Sindical Organization) in May. The latter reforms provoked open hostility from sectors of the military and the right that had previously tolerated Suárez's plan. However, by that time, Suárez had gained an important popular mandate, and a crucial vote of confidence from the opposition. In addition, a significant sector of the franquist right was busy preparing for elections that it (mistakenly) hoped to win.

CONCLUSION

The first section of this article presented a fourfold typology of transitions from authoritarian to democratic rule. The dynamics of, and conditions for, each type of democratic transition can be expected to differ considerably. A brief examination of the Spanish transition to democracy, a rare case of transition through transaction, suggests that this form of democratization requires some particularly demanding conditions for its initiation and implementation.

The long-term conditions for the initiation of transition through transaction were first, a serious succession crisis, created by the death of the regime's only charismatic leader, and second, a lack of consensus concerning the appropriate solution to the crisis. More proximate conditions included the widely perceived exhaustion of a more limited reform of franquism after Arias's failure, and Juan Carlos's decision to break the resulting deadlock by attempting to endow the monarchy with a new democratic legitimacy. The most direct conditions for the

initiation of transition through transaction were the political will and skill of Adolfo Suárez. Suárez designed the complex strategy of transition through transaction, despite widespread skepticism. He understood *why* it was important that the franquist regime initiate the transition to democracy. Moreover, he understood *how* the franquist regime could produce such a transition.

This article has highlighted three conditions for the successful implementation of transition through transaction. First, Suárez, with the support of the king, was able to garner support for demoncratization from a wide range of regime forces. Second, most of the democratic opposition was persuaded to participate in the Suárez reform. Third, Suárez's government was able to maintain significant control over the political situation to allow for rapid but orderly transition.

When considering the likelihood for the initiation of transition through transaction in other authoritarian regimes, the long-term conditions do not appear overly restrictive. Succession crises plague all authoritarian regimes, although they are especially devastating when a single ruler has dominated the regime for so long. The more proximate conditions in the Spanish case are less likely to be replicated elsewhere. While leaders who succeed a long-lived authoritarian ruler may often attempt to relegitimate their rule through political reform, democratization appears an unlikely outcome. Limited reform, much like that of Caetano in Portugal, or Arias in Spain, would appear to be more likely.

Where succeeding leadership brings to power a new generation of leaders, especially where the younger generation is not directly linked to the establishment of authoritarian rule, the prospects for the initiation of transition through transaction are increased. In Spain, the combination of the more common long-term conditions, and the more unusual proximate conditions, facilitated the initiation of transactive democratization.

The successful implementation of transition through transaction in Spain also had macro- and micro-level conditions. Most generally, and paradoxically, the absence of direct threats to the continuation of authoritarian rule encouraged the military to accept Suárez's plan. Had the regime's control over the transition been seriously challenged, the military's trust in Suárez's ability to limit the reform would have diminished. Likewise, the overwhelming superiority of the regime's strength, compared with that of the opposition forces, made it easier for the opposition to accept transition through transaction. Had the

prospects for a successful transition through rupture been greater, the incentive to accept the Suárez plan would have declined. The implication for other political systems, then, is that transition through transaction is likely to be successfully implemented from relatively strong and secure authoritarian regimes, and not in regimes that fear for their very survival. In this respect, the contrast with transitions through rupture could not be greater.

It is often noted, quite correctly, that there was an important reservoir of popular support for democratic rule. Suárez drew on this reservoir to build momentum for his leadership, to carry him through some of the most difficult moments of the reform's implementation, and to facilitate the consolidation of transition through transaction. Nevertheless, the presence of this widespread desire for democratic rule—no doubt the product of economic growth and affluence, increased exposure to Western democracies, a general fatigue with authoritarian rule, and a general desire for change—does not explain the implementation of transition through transaction, even if it indirectly contributed to it.

At the micro-political level, the remarkable skill of political elites was an important condition for the successful implementation of transition through transaction. Most important were the actions of Adolfo Suárez. I have already alluded to his innate qualities, including his professional and generational credentials. Equally important, he possessed the ability to convince the regime right, at least initially, of his desire to protect the essence of authoritarian rule. He was willing and able to gain the trust and confidence, and eventually the support, of the democratic opposition. Many other successors to Arias might have initiated a transition through transaction, but it is difficult to imagine its successful implementation under less talented leadership. In short, Suárez possessed the skill to manage the many complexities of transition through transaction.

Likewise, the leaders of the democratic opposition performed an important role in the implementation of transition through transaction. Their ability to eschew ideological rigidity, and to embrace the politics of moderation and compromise, was by no means inevitable. In the case of the most important opposition force, the PSOE, a generational shift in the top leadership—similar in many ways to the change in government—undoubtedly facilitated the ability to embrace transition through transaction.

The comparative implications of this emphasis on the role of leadership are clear. Other authoritarian regimes may experience the initiation of transition through transaction. Some may even enjoy the presence of favorable macro-level conditions for the implementation of transition through transaction. Very few are likely to have, in addition, exceptionally skilled leaders in the regime and opposition. The Spanish case reminds us that, in the end, it is up to political elites to square the circle of transition through transaction.

NOTES

1. Some examples of the recent comparative works on the topic of transitions to democracy are O'Donnell et al. (1986); Herz (1982); Huntington (1984); Linz (1981); Bruneau (1983); Pridham (1984); Viola and Mainwaring (1985); Share and Mainwaring (1986); Luna (1983); Orrego Vicuña (1985).

2. For an overview, see Chilcote (1981: 271-312) and Packenham (1973: 195-241).

3. Among the few examples are Dahl (1971: 33-47) and Schmitter (1979).

4. An important treatment of this matter is Viola and Mainwaring (1985).

5. A more detailed analysis of this typology is Share (1984: chap. 1).

6. The concept of backward and forward legitimation is developed in Di Palma (1980a: 132-145).

7. For a discussion of why revolutions are less likely to produce democratic regimes, see Huntington (1984: 212). He states that "democratic regimes that last have seldom, if ever, been initiated by popular action. Almost always, democracy has come as much from the top down as from the bottom up; it is as likely to be the product of oligarchy as of protest against oligarchy."

8. This should not obscure the fact that revolutions may produce regimes far more democratic than their predecessors, even while failing to meet our initial standards of democracy.

9. For an recent example of concern about the prospects for what we have called transition through transaction, see the editorial article "On Negotiating Democratic Transition" in *Third World Quarterly* 2 (April 1985), xii-xvi.

10. The term "transition through transaction" was first employed by Di Palma (1980b: 166). Di Palma uses the term to denote a "syncretic" form of transition. Its usage here connotes negotiation between authoritarian and opposition elites. For a more detailed and comparative discussion of the conditions for transition through transaction, see Share and Mainwaring (1986).

11. Juan Linz's discussion of the importance of agenda setting is revelant to this point. See Linz (1978: 41-43).

12. A particularly provocative analysis of the problems confronting the consolidation of parliamentary democracy after authoritarian rule is Gunther (1985) and Gunther et al. (1986).

13. See Share (1984) for a more detailed and documented argument.

14. On the growth of working-class and student opposition see Maravall (1978). On the organized democratic opposition see Tussell (1976).

15. The Sociedad Sacerdotal de la Santa Cruz (Opus Dei) is a secular institute of the Roman Catholic Church. This worldwide lay organization is centered in Rome, with branches in over 70 countries. In Spain, the Opus Dei technocrats became especially prominent in the spheres of government, education (especially higher education), and business. For an overview see Ynfante (1970).

16. For a description of the families of franquism, see Linz (1979).

17. A major exception was the franquist coalition's loss of the Catholic Church as a loyal member. By 1973 the Spanish Church had become seriously split between staunch franquists, Opus Dei technocrats, and progressives.

18. There are few published works concerning the attitudes and motivations of Juan Carlos during the transition. Among the most provocative are Bardavío (1979) and Alba (1981).

19. It is no coincidence that the two forms of consensual transition outlined in the first section of this article, incremental transition and transition through transaction, both appear to be associated with the institution of the monarchy. In such cases as the United Kingdom, Sweden, and Spain, the monarch has played a key role as "legitimator" of democratic change and "guarantor" of vestiges of the weakened authoritarian past. In the absence of a monarch, respected elder statesmen like Tancredo Neves in Brazil may be able to perform a similar function.

20. There is ample evidence that the opposition was dismayed by the King's selection of Suárez. For examples of the widespread skepticism, see Morán (1979: 306).

21. Interviews with Suárez's closest aides, conducted during 1981 and 1982, confirmed that Suárez was far more uncomfortable dealing with pressures from the regime right than with the forces of the left.

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Donald Share received his Ph. D. in political science from Stanford University. He is currently Assistant Professor of Politics and Government at the University of Puget Sound. His publications include The Making of Spanish Democracy *(Praeger Publishers, 1986) and "Two Transitions: Democratisation and the Evolution of the Spanish Socialist Left" in* West European Politics (January 1985).