ranging from Zapatista rebels in Chiapas and popular organizing in the cities to the *barzón* movement of middle-class families seeking to preserve their hard-won livelihoods in an era of economic upheaval. A final section relates the perils and possibilities encountered by Mexicans on the border and in the United States.

On the whole, the essays serve to demystify Mexican culture, but the risk remains of reinforcing negative stereotypes. An exemplary reading by Inga Clendinnen situates human sacrifice within the Mexica worldview, thus countering a common tendency toward sensationalizing the indigenous civilizations. More problematic is a letter by the notorious U.S. consul in revolutionary Puebla, William Jenkins, describing an encounter with Carrancista troops. Although this document could be the starting point for a lively class discussion about revolutionary armies, moral economy, and popular nationalism, such subtleties of historiography may be lost on many readers, leaving them simply with Jenkins' view of ordinary Mexicans as an uncivilized rabble.

The editors have tied the diverse selections together through clear introductions and explanatory footnotes, with only an occasional slip such as mistaking *pulses* (i.e., frijoles) for *pulque* (p. 14). The press left a number of pages inexplicably blank in the first print run. Nevertheless, this volume will make a thought provoking read for undergraduate students, for vacationers on the beach in Acapulco, or—a professor's spring break fantasy—both.

The Citadel JEFFREY M. PILCHER
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Militarization, Democracy, and Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America. By Kirk S. Bowman. University Park: Penn State University Press, 2003. Pp. xiv, 289. Illustrations. References. Index. $55.00 cloth.

Recent political science literature has produced few works that are as compelling and important as Kirk Bowman's *Military, Democracy, and Development.* Bowman's path breaking work makes significant contributions to important debates in the areas of social science methodology, the role of the military in Latin America, and the nature of Costa Rican and Honduran political development. Its magnificent research design and jargon-free presentation should make this book required reading in any advanced course dealing with Latin American politics or research methodology.

Bowman attacks the body of statistical research that has long associated high levels of militarization (the size of the military budget and the size of the population in arms) with development (democracy, economic growth, and equity). He argues that in Latin America (unlike other regions of the world) militarization hinders development, which is self-evident to any Latin Americanist. However, Bowman is the first scholar to demonstrate and explain this finding using both quantitative analysis and a set of comparative historical case studies (i.e., Costa Rica and Honduras). He contends that the consequences of militarization in Latin America con-

tradict the conventional wisdom because of the historical conservatism and institutional autonomy of Latin American militaries, their internal security focus, and the Cold-War influence of the United States.

Bowman's historical case studies are fascinating and meticulously researched. In his treatment of Costa Rica he challenges the established view that the country achieved democracy because of its exceptional culture, class structure, agrarian labor practices, or elite pacts. He contends that Costa Rican democracy after the 1948 civil war was extraordinarily fragile and the absence of a military is a major reason why democracy was finally consolidated in the late 1950s. The creation of a Costa Rican social democracy under José Figueres engendered the same type of elite hostility that would be expected in other Central American countries, but the upper classes lacked a military ally and, unlike their counterparts in El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras, could not use the military to seize power from democratic politicians. Bowman is making a counterfactual argument here, but he persuasively uses Honduras as a comparative case study to support his contention.

Bowman's discussion of Honduras illustrates exactly how militarization can obstruct democracy, economic growth, and equity. In the 1950s Honduras and Costa Rica looked broadly similar. Both were small and relatively homogeneous countries with abundant land, export economies, and relatively weak aristocratic classes. Bowman argues that in some ways Honduras should have made been a more likely candidate for democratic development than Costa Rica, in part because the former had a history of a weaker military. He shows that the Cold War policy of the United States fostered a dramatic militarization of Honduras and squashed attempts to emulate the Costa Rica's demilitarization. Moreover, he illustrates how militarization hindered the country's development both during and after the Cold War. While Costa Rica was able to respond to the pan-Latin American economic crisis of the 1980s by promoting new exports and tourism, Honduras remained (and remains to this day) mired in a debilitating struggle to distance the military from politics.

This beautifully organized and crafted work is social science at its best. Bowman has skillfully and comprehensively mined the relevant literatures. He has staked out important new methodological ground in the debate between large-N quantitative researchers and area-studies experts (who analyze fewer cases with more in-depth historical analysis). His study depends on and integrates both types of analysis, but his methodological argument is clearly stated: those who attempt to apply conclusions derived from large-N quantitative studies run the risk of making gigantic errors. Only Bowman's two in-depth comparative cases allow him to understand why such studies of the relationship between militarization and development are dead wrong when applied to Latin America. Only the Latin America area-studies expert can understand that earlier attempts to treat the levels of militarization of developing countries as a single independent variable were doomed to fail.

As icing on an already formidable cake, Bowman exacts concrete policy implications from his research. Following former Costa Rican president Oscar Arias,

Bowman calls on the United States to actively promote demilitarization in Latin America. Unfortunately, despite the end of the Cold War and the return of democracy to virtually all of Latin America, the United States has failed to help remove the military cancer from Latin American societies.

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Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America. By Ted Galen Carpenter. New York: Palgrave, 2003. Pp. 282. Notes. Index. $24.95 cloth.

Ted Galen Carpenter, Vice-President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, offers an impassioned libertarian critique of the United States' counter-narcotics policy in Latin America. Although he adds little new information to the ongoing debate on this issue, his consistently well-written, in-depth analysis of the U.S. war on drugs and its destructive effects on Latin America is very effective. Unfortunately, the drug legalization alternative that the author proposes in his concluding chapter is discussed too briefly and uncritically to be persuasive.

After describing the development of U.S. counter-narcotics policy from the Nixon administration through the current Bush government, Carpenter carefully examines the three principal components of the supply-side strategy employed by the United States: (1) interdiction of drug-trafficking routes; (2) drug-crop eradication measures; and (3) crop substitution and alternative development programs. Each is found wanting. The author cites official sources to prove that interdiction efforts seldom capture more than about 10 percent of illegal drugs bound for the United States from Latin America. Moreover, he shows that even the most successful coca eradication projects in Bolivia and Peru in the late 1990s simply caused cocaine traffickers to increase coca cultivation in Colombia. In addition, he demonstrates that alternative crop programs generally fail because coca growing is much easier and four to ten times more profitable than the cultivation of bananas, coffee, or other crops. For these reasons, Carpenter argues, none of the three initiatives has produced a significant or lasting decline in cocaine supply to U.S. retail street markets. Indeed, despite the billions of dollars devoted to the drug war, cocaine prices in the United States have fallen dramatically since the 1980s.

Although the U.S. supply-side counter-narcotics strategy has not reduced the availability of cocaine and other illegal drugs, Carpenter shows convincingly that the war on drugs has brought misery to Colombia and other Latin American countries where narcotics are grown, processed, or transported. Bullying tactics by U.S. diplomats have undermined the sovereignty of Latin American governments and forced them into unnecessarily violent confrontations with drug traffickers. Spraying coca crops with herbicides has also alienated large segments of the peasantry, particularly in Bolivia and Colombia. In addition, corruption has increased dramatically as the drug traffickers' offer of "*plata o plomo*" (money or lead) has proven difficult to refuse. Even U.S. counter-narcotics policies that have achieved their