



Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. by Felipe Agüero

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The American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 928-929

Published by: [American Political Science Association](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2945896>

Accessed: 29/12/2012 18:21

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housing markets, examining the evidence from fair housing audits and from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data. This is followed by a potentially explosive discussion of the costs to blacks and Hispanics of housing discrimination. Yinger calculates that "the cost imposed on blacks and Hispanics by current housing discrimination comes to \$4.1 billion a year" (p. 103). Although the discussion is submerged in such arcane economic terminology as "starting surplus" and "willingness to pay," the meat of it will not be lost on attorneys litigating cases on behalf of plaintiffs in housing discrimination suits or minority reparations initiatives. If these costs are the appropriate economic measures of the illegal housing discrimination—in violation of state and federal statutes—then somebody is going to be very upset when they have to pay up. Of course, there are other costs outlined by Yinger, such as those associated with depressed employment opportunities and reduced educational access. But it is the \$4.1 billion figure that stands out. Before long, some aggrieved party is going to say, "I want my \$4.1 billion" and will point with authority to Yinger's seminal analysis.

That is why Yinger's introductory analysis of race and ethnicity is so important for understanding this work. Ultimately, as he argues in the concluding sections on policy options, any antidiscrimination effort worth undertaking must attack the core or foundation upon which racial and ethnic prejudice rests. Along with the standard admonishments of better enforcement of current laws, Yinger calls for revamped public rhetoric and acknowledgment and condemnation of racial and ethnic discrimination. "During the Reagan/Bush years," he says, "the public rhetoric was mixed . . . they gave comfort to people who want to discriminate and heightened the prejudicial attitudes that lead many blacks and whites to prefer not to live with each other" (p. 218). In essence, Yinger sees the problem of racism and ethnic bias as a social phenomenon influenced in substantial ways by political rhetoric.

Because he believes the "mixed signals" of political leaders and government officials of the Reagan-Bush era contributed to the current crisis, Yinger includes public

statements denouncing racism in his list of policy prescriptions for reversing the crisis. He says, "The president and other national leaders could have a significant positive impact on race relations in this country with a regular series of strong public statements against racial and ethnic prejudice and discrimination" (p. 218). He concludes: "The national desperately needs a fair, nondiscriminatory program that attacks current discrimination, closes the disparities that hold back so many of our black and Hispanic citizens, and promotes individual and community responsibility" (p. 219).

It is unlikely, however, that the architects of the California Civil Rights Initiative—a massive anti-affirmative action undertaking—or the author of the Louisiana governor's executive order barring affirmative action in public employment, contracting and procurement, and public education would disagree with a proposal that is "fair" and "nondiscriminatory." The question is how political rhetoric can help. Could it possibly hurt, given the play on words one finds in current anti-affirmative action campaigns? Yinger recognizes the deleterious effects of negative political rhetoric on housing market discrimination. But can the reversal come about merely by public rhetoric that denounces racism? Indeed, since many of the political opponents of antidiscrimination initiatives have embraced the language he proscribes, one wonders whether political rhetoric—once its harm has been done—can work in reverse. Is there symmetry in the bad and good public rhetoric underlying racism?

Yinger makes a persuasive case that housing discrimination continues to persist and that the political rhetoric of the Reagan-Bush era gave legitimacy to the lackluster enforcement efforts of the 1980s. Yet the case still must be made for reversing this trend by adopting vigorous political rhetoric alongside such other noteworthy efforts as strict enforcement of other existing laws or better support for schools and jobs. Ultimately, one must question whether the political rhetoric that seems to contribute to racial, social, and economic inequality is the *cause* or the *reflection* of the racially hostile marketplace the book documents.

Comparative Politics

Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective. By Felipe Agüero. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995. 316p. \$48.00.

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Spain's remarkable transition from authoritarianism to democracy between 1975 and 1978 is often cited as the paragon of peaceful and relatively rapid regime transition. However, the failed coup attempt of February 23, 1981, in which Spain's parliament and government were held hostage by disgruntled military officers, highlights the crucial role of the military in even the most successful transitions to democracy. Felipe Agüero's outstanding book provides a much needed framework for comparing the role of the military in transitions to democracy.

This book covers little new ground in its treatment of Spain's transition to democracy, though it does provide a very useful description of the Spanish armed forces during the democratization process. Instead, Agüero's most important and original contribution is his development of an

entirely compelling comparative framework with which he attempts to explain the role of the military during regime change. In the tradition of the best comparative research methodology, Agüero deftly uses the Spanish case for both inductive and illustrative purposes.

Agüero correctly notes that the literature on democratization is now replete with comparative studies of economic, international systemic, political institutional, and leadership causes of democratization. Agüero's work is the first to focus on the crucial role of the military. Indeed, even after transitions to democracy in Southern Europe and Latin America, the military remained a (arguably *the*) major threat to the new democratic order. Agüero's main research task is to identify what factors allowed democratic reformers to resist military pressure both during and after the transitions to democracy. Agüero wants to know "how [reformers] empower themselves to lead the military to tolerate the establishment of a political regime it initially did not favor" (p. 6). The existing literature on democratization tends to reduce the military to a purely reactive institution, responding to changes in society at large. However, Agüero reminds us that the military in the cases he

considers is often the institution most insulated from society. In order to better answer his research question, Agüero advocates a look at some variables that have been largely passed over in the existing literature.

First, he urges consideration of the role of the military in the outgoing authoritarian regime. The Spanish and Portuguese authoritarian regimes (*civilianized regimes*), in contrast to their Latin American counterparts (*militarized regimes*), did not place the military at center stage. Latin American militaries were thus better situated to control the nature of the transition to democracy. Second, Agüero calls attention to the “path” of the transition, distinguishing between evolutionary transitions from authoritarian rule and cases of collapse of the authoritarian regime. Third, Agüero also focuses on the role played by internal divisions within the military. Spain’s military was divided between the majority of Francoist loyalists and a small but visible cohort of democratic reformers. Similar divisions were less visible in Agüero’s Latin American cases, in part due to the need to close ranks against attempts to prosecute members of the military for human rights abuses. The presence of such intramural divisions greatly facilitated the initiation and consolidation of the Spanish transition, while the absence of such schisms constrained democratic consolidation in Latin America. Agüero also skillfully presents (chap. 6) a set of variables determining the success of democratization and military reform in the posttransition period, including the strength and coherence of the government (the absence of which largely explained the attempted coup by the Spanish armed forces in 1981), the ability of the government to maintain social order, and the timing of military reforms.

Spain’s experience is compared with southern European and Latin American cases throughout the book; but for general readers interested mainly in the comparative analysis of militaries in democratic transitions, chapter 7 contains an excellent application of Agüero’s model to the Greek, Portuguese, and Latin American cases.

This carefully crafted work has few shortcomings; but as any original and provocative work, it does raise questions. In his treatment of the Spanish military Agüero correctly contends that despite the historical antagonism between the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the military, the PSOE governments after 1982 were in a stronger position to impose serious reforms of the Spanish military than the Socialists’ conservative predecessors. In light of recent allegations that top Socialist officials may have coordinated a death squad-like operation against suspected Basque terrorists, one wonders whether the Socialists were indeed as free from military pressure as Agüero suggests. If Socialist complicity in these death squads is proven, was it an attempt by the PSOE government to allay military concerns about Basque terrorism?

The most serious question raised by this book is why Agüero chose his case studies entirely from southern Europe and Latin America, following in the footsteps of many works in the 1970s and 1980s. During those decades, however, the justification for such selection of case studies was that most cases of democratization were limited to these two regions. The 1990s, however, have seen the deepening of what Samuel Huntington has called the “Third Wave” of democratization. One wonders why Agüero did not try to apply his model, at least briefly and speculatively, to the more recent transitions in Eastern Europe, Asia, and South Africa. Agüero gives us a smattering of such broader comparative analysis in a couple of points in the book but never takes the analysis of these cases any farther. Indeed, including cases from Eastern Europe

and South Africa would have made Spain seem far less unique, at least in terms of being “the only state among those considered . . . which is made up of distinct nationalities” (p. 137).

The mechanics of this book are first-rate. Agüero writes clearly and manages to avoid the jargon so common in political science works. The book is methodically researched and brilliantly organized. The only technical flaw is the curious absence of a bibliography on democratization and the military, but this lack is partly offset by the extensive documentation in the endnotes. This book not only stands out as a fine contribution to the literature on democratic transitions, but it should also be recognized as a fine example of thoughtfully conceived and carefully structured comparative analysis.

Feminists, Islam, and Nation: Gender and the Making of Modern Egypt. By Margot Badran. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995. 352p. \$35.00.

Women and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran. By Parvin Paidar. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 401p. \$59.95.

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From the eighteenth century until the 1960s, the study of Middle Eastern polities had been dominated by the Orientalist paradigm. According to this paradigm, Western social scientific concepts of class, nationalism, and gender are as irrelevant to an understanding of the Middle East as are Western ideals of equality, rule of law, democracy, liberalism, and socialism, wherever Islam determines the behaviors of rulers and ruled alike.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the modernization paradigm replaced the hitherto-unchallenged Orientalist paradigm. The persistence of authoritarian forms of governments was explained by a new breed of modernization scholars utilizing political culture explanations to argue that the lack of a civic culture—caused primarily by Islam in the Middle East—accounts for political backwardness despite obvious economic and social progress. Modernization theorists discarded all but two concepts from the Orientalist paradigm: an essentialist conception of Islam, in which Islam is viewed as a set of unchanging dogmas and principles, and the concept of national character.

In the early 1970s, neo-Marxist and dependency school scholars specializing in the Middle East employed concepts of class and imperialism in their analyses. According to these scholars, imperialism and colonialism were the causes of backwardness.

The emergence in the late 1970s and early 1980s of Islamic fundamentalist movements and regimes—that appeared to be atavistic and intent on proving true the worst stereotypes of Muslims and Islam—gave rise to a new paradigm that has been called neo-Orientalism. The neo-Orientalists share with the Orientalists the same essentialist view of Islam. Moreover, this unchanging and ahistorical Islam is regarded as an independent variable determining behaviors—political or otherwise—in these polities.

The two books under review are among an emerging body of scholarship in Middle East studies that utilize Western social scientific concepts of gender, class, and ideology to challenge the aforementioned paradigms. They criticize Orientalist, modernization, and neo-Orientalist scholars for their essentialist notion of Islam. Instead, they argue that there are numerous and conflicting Islamic